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Protocols with no acknowledgment

Author

Listed:
  • Dinah Rosenberg

    (LAGA - Laboratoire Analyse, Géométrie et Applications - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - Institut Galilée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Eilon Solan

    (TAU - Tel Aviv University)

  • Nicolas Vieille

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We study a simple protocol for communication networks, in which users get no receipt acknowledgment of their requests. As a result, users hold partial and differential information over the state of the protocol. We characterize optimal behavior by viewing the protocol as a stochastic game with partial observation. We also study two classes of protocols that generalize this protocol.

Suggested Citation

  • Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "Protocols with no acknowledgment," Post-Print hal-00491697, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00491697
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.1080.0644
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    2. S. Gal & J. V. Howard, 2005. "Rendezvous-Evasion Search in Two Boxes," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 53(4), pages 689-697, August.
    3. Steve Alpern & Shmuel Gal, 2002. "Searching for an Agent Who May OR May Not Want to be Found," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 50(2), pages 311-323, April.
    4. George E. Monahan, 1982. "State of the Art---A Survey of Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes: Theory, Models, and Algorithms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 1-16, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hugo Gimbert & Jérôme Renault & Sylvain Sorin & Xavier Venel & Wieslaw Zielonka, 2016. "On the values of repeated games with signals," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01006951, HAL.
    2. Xavier Venel, 2015. "Commutative Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 40(2), pages 403-428, February.

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    Keywords

    games/group decisions; stochastic;

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