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Majority voting on restricted domains

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  • Dietrich, Franz
  • List, Christian

Abstract

In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments sufficient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition generalizes Sen's triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove a new characterization theorem: for a large class of domains, if there exists any aggregation function satisfying some democratic conditions, then majority voting is the unique such function. Taken together, our results support the robustness of majority rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2010. "Majority voting on restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 512-543, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:2:p:512-543
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    2. Franz Dietrich, 2007. "A generalised model of judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 529-565, June.
    3. Mongin, Philippe, 2008. "Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 100-113, July.
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    12. Dietrich, Franz, 2010. "The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 603-638, March.
    13. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2008. "Judgment aggregation without full rationality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 15-39, June.
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    17. List, Christian, 2003. "A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-13, February.
    18. Laffond, G. & Laine, J., 2006. "Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 49-66, July.
    19. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2007. "Judgment Aggregation By Quota Rules," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(4), pages 391-424, October.
    20. Dokow, Elad & Holzman, Ron, 2010. "Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 544-561, March.
    21. Dietrich, Franz, 2006. "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 286-298, January.
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    2. Mei, Tianhua & Liu, Jie & Guo, Jianming & Siano, Pierluigi & Jin, Xuanxuan, 2022. "Allocation of emission allowances considering strategic voting," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    3. List, Christian & Polak, Ben, 2010. "Introduction to judgment aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 441-466, March.
    4. Dietrich, Franz, 2016. "Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 113-136.
    5. Franz Dietrich, 2014. "Scoring rules for judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(4), pages 873-911, April.
    6. García-Bermejo, Juan Carlos, 2012. "A Pooling Approach to Judgment Aggregation," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2012/01, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
    7. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Leif Danziger, 2015. "When is voting optimal?," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 341-356, October.
    8. Nehring, Klaus & Pivato, Marcus & Puppe, Clemens, 2014. "The Condorcet set: Majority voting over interconnected propositions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 268-303.
    9. Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2021. "Social Epistemology," Post-Print halshs-02431971, HAL.
    10. Crès, Hervé & Gilboa, Itzhak & Vieille, Nicolas, 2024. "Bureaucracy in quest of feasibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    11. Mongin, Philippe & Dietrich, Franz, 2011. "An interpretive account of logical aggregation theory," HEC Research Papers Series 941, HEC Paris.
    12. Nehring, Klaus & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Majority rule in the absence of a majority," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 213-257.
    13. Philippe Mongin, 2012. "The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 315-355, September.
    14. Frederik S. Herzberg, 2013. "The (im)possibility of collective risk measurement: Arrovian aggregation of variational preferences," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(1), pages 69-92, May.
    15. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/dambferfb7dfprc9m2e02cub3 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Cres, Herve & Gilboa, Itzhak & Vieille, Nicolas, 2012. "Bureaucracy in Quest for Feasibility," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275779, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    17. García-Bermejo, Juan Carlos, 2013. "A Non-Proposition-Wise Variant of Majority Voting for Aggregating Judgments," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2013/02, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
    18. Nehring, Klaus & Pivato, Marcus & Puppe, Clemens, 2011. "Condorcet admissibility: Indeterminacy and path-dependence under majority voting on interconnected decisions," MPRA Paper 32434, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Herzberg, Frederik S., 2008. "Judgement aggregation functions and ultraproducts," MPRA Paper 10546, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Sep 2008.
    20. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2021. "Dynamically rational judgment aggregation," Post-Print halshs-03140090, HAL.
    21. Terzopoulou, Zoi, 2020. "Quota rules for incomplete judgments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 23-36.
    22. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/dambferfb7dfprc9m2e02cub3 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Yang, Yongjie & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2023. "Group control for consent rules with consecutive qualifications," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 1-7.
    24. Marcus Pivato, 2009. "Geometric models of consistent judgement aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(4), pages 559-574, November.
    25. Fujun Hou, 2024. "A new social welfare function with a number of desirable properties," Papers 2403.16373, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Judgment aggregation Domain restriction Majority voting Consistency Value-restriction Analogues of single-peakedness May's theorem;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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