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Political Partisanship and Financial Reforms in Advanced Countries

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  • Thibault Darcillon

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

Applying regressions on a sample of 18 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009 using new indicators, we find that right-wing governments liberalize more the financial sector that left-wing governments. We show that if a left-wing government accepts to liberalize the financial sector, an increase of social security expenditures can facilitate the adoption of a new legislation in the financial sector. To estimate the impact of the government partisan affiliation on the corporate governance legislation, we use a probit model and a conditional Cox model in gap time in 16 OECD over the 1970-2009 period. Statistically, we find that right-wing governments enhance more pro-shareholder policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Thibault Darcillon, 2011. "Political Partisanship and Financial Reforms in Advanced Countries," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00639840, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00639840
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00639840
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    Keywords

    Effet partisan; libéralisation financière; gouvernance d'entreprise; changement institutionnel.; Political Partisanship; financial liberalization; corporate governance; institutional change.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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