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Financial Regulation in the Crisis Regulation, Market Discipline, Internal Control: The Big Three in turmoil

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  • Jézabel Couppey-Soubeyran

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The financial crisis has revealed the dysfunction of all banking and financial regulatory mechanisms. Prudential regulation failed to prevent the meltdown. Market discipline neglected to send any warning signals. Internal control was seriously undermined by doubtful dealings, in France as elsewhere. Does the crisis call the big three into question? No regulation mechanism is omniscient, whether it be state, market or self-regulation. As such, none of three can operate without the other two, with the corollary that they can only function together. It means that splitting up the big three can therefore not be the answer to the crisis. By contrast, since each one of them has shown its weaknesses, the only solution is to work on reinforcing each one. Unfortunately there is no guarantee that the reforms go far enough.

Suggested Citation

  • Jézabel Couppey-Soubeyran, 2010. "Financial Regulation in the Crisis Regulation, Market Discipline, Internal Control: The Big Three in turmoil," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00627436, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00627436
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00627436
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Meier, Samira & Rodriguez Gonzalez, Miguel & Kunze, Frederik, 2021. "The global financial crisis, the EMU sovereign debt crisis and international financial regulation: lessons from a systematic literature review," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    2. Thierry Warin & Robert E. Prasch, 2013. "Systemic Risk in the Financial Industry: “Mimetism” for the Best and for the Worst," CIRANO Working Papers 2013s-29, CIRANO.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prudential supervision; market discipline; internal control; financial regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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