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An algorithm for two-player repeated games with imperfect public monitoring

Author

Listed:
  • Jasmina Karabegovic

    (University of Graz, Austria)

Abstract

This paper introduces an explicit algorithm for computing perfect public equilibrium (PPE) payoffs in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, public randomization, and discounting. The method adapts the established framework by Abreu, Pearce, & Stacchetti (1990) into a practical tool that balances theoretical accuracy with computational efficiency. The algorithm simplifies the complex task of identifying PPE payoff sets for any given discount factor. A stand-alone implementation of the algorithm can be accessed on GitHub (https://github.com/jasmina-karabegovic/IRGames).

Suggested Citation

  • Jasmina Karabegovic, 2024. "An algorithm for two-player repeated games with imperfect public monitoring," Graz Economics Papers 2024-15, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:grz:wpaper:2024-15
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    File URL: https://unipub.uni-graz.at/obvugrveroeff/download/pdf/10414075?originalFilename=true
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repeated games; imperfect public monitoring; computation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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