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Reputation-Based Pricing and Price Improvements in Dealership Markets

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  • Foucault, Thierry
  • Desgranges, Gabriel

Abstract

In many security markets, dealers trade with their regular clients at a discount relative to prevailing bid and ask quotes. In this article we provide an explanation to this phenomenon. We consider a dealer and an investor engaged in a long-term relationship. The dealer assigns a reputational index to his client. This index increases (reputation decreases) when the client conducts trades which results in a loss for the regular dealer. The dealer grants a price improvement if and only if the client?s index is smaller than a threshold and suspends price improvements otherwise. We show that this pricing strategy induces the investor to refrain from exploiting private information against their regular dealer. We also find that it worsens the quotes posted by other dealers. For this reason, there are cases in which the investor is better off if long-term relationships are impossible (for instance, if trading is anonymous). Our model predicts that a dealer?s decision to grant a price improvement depends on their past trading profits with the trader requesting the improvement.

Suggested Citation

  • Foucault, Thierry & Desgranges, Gabriel, 2002. "Reputation-Based Pricing and Price Improvements in Dealership Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 3359, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3359
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    Cited by:

    1. Battalio, Robert & Ellul, Andrew & Jennings, Robert, 2005. "Reputation effects in trading on the New York Stock Exchange," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24659, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Belief-free price formation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 342-365.
    3. He, Yinghua & Nielsson, Ulf & Guo, Hong & Yang, Jiong, 2014. "Subscribing to transparency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 189-206.
    4. Degryse, H.A., 2007. "Competition on financial markets : Does market design matter?," Other publications TiSEM ee5530b2-34f7-4d95-ad62-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Kaun Y. Lee & Kee H. Chung, 2009. "Information‐Based Trading and Price Improvement," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(5‐6), pages 754-773, June.
    6. Pierre Collin‐Dufresne & Benjamin Junge & Anders B. Trolle, 2020. "Market Structure and Transaction Costs of Index CDSs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(5), pages 2719-2763, October.
    7. Theissen, Erik, 2003. "Organized equity markets in Germany," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/17, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    8. Asaf Bernstein & Eric Hughson & Marc D. Weidenmier, 2014. "Counterparty Risk and the Establishment of the New York Stock Exchange Clearinghouse," NBER Working Papers 20459, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Pierre Collin-Dufresne & Benjamin Junge & Anders B. Trolle, 2018. "Market Structure and Transaction Costs of Index CDSs," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 18-40, Swiss Finance Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market microstructure; Reputation and implicit contracts; Non-anonymous trading;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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