Competition or Co-Operation
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Other versions of this item:
- Güth, W. & Kliemt, H., 1993. "Competition or Co-Operation," Discussion Paper 1993-39, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Heiner, Ronald Asher, 2002. "Robust Evolution Of Contingent Cooperation In Pure One-Shot Prisoners' Dilemmas. Part II: Evolutionary Dynamics & Testable Predictions," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-10, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2009.
"Equilibrium vengeance,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 813-829, July.
- Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2002. "Equilibrium Vengeance," CESifo Working Paper Series 766, CESifo.
- Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Equilibrium Vengeance," MPRA Paper 4321, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dufwenberg, M. & Güth, W., 1997.
"Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation : A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions,"
Other publications TiSEM
5e16a5c7-9a69-467f-b00a-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Güth, Werner, 1998. "Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Working Paper Series 1998:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Dufwenberg, M. & Guth, W., 1998. "Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Papers 1998-09, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- Dufwenberg, M. & Güth, W., 1997. "Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation : A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Discussion Paper 1997-12, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Güth, Werner, 1997. "Indirect evolution versus strategic delegation: A comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1997,28, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Anders Poulsen & Gert Svendsen, 2005. "Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 171-196, April.
- Güth, Werner & Ockenfels, Axel, 2005.
"The coevolution of morality and legal institutions: an indirect evolutionary approach,"
Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 155-174, December.
- Werner Güth & Axel Ockenfels, "undated". "The Coevolution of Morality and Legal Institutions - An indirect evolutionary approach -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-06, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2011. "Economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements?," Department of Economics University of Siena 617, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews & Okomboli Ong’ong’a, 2004.
"Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms,"
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 407-429, October.
- Peter Matthews & Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "Why Punish: Social Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Prosocial Norms," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0213, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
- Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews & Okomboli Ong'ong'a, 2003. "Why Punish: Social Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Prosocial Norms," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0213r, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
- Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2002.
"Social Reciprocity,"
Middlebury College Working Paper Series
0229, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
- Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2004. "Social Reciprocity," IZA Discussion Papers 1347, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2004. "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0229r, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Werner Guth, 2003. "Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000789, David K. Levine.
- Güth Werner & Kliemt Hartmut & Peleg Bezalel, 2000.
"Co-evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust,"
German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 83-110, February.
- Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Bezalel Peleg, 2000. "Co‐evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(1), pages 83-110, February.
- Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut & Peleg, Bezalel, 1998. "Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1998,72, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2012.
"Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective,"
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 367-383, April.
- Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2011. "Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective," Working Papers 11-06, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2011.
- Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2012. "Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective," Post-Print hal-00715459, HAL.
- Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 2009. "Bygones are Bygones," Rationality, Markets and Morals, Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, vol. 0(10), November.
- Güth, Werner, 1998. "Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1998,5, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2004.
"Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups,"
Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Steffen Huck (ed.), Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour, chapter 3, pages 28-54,
Palgrave Macmillan.
- Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2004. "Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0xp29105, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups," Game Theory and Information 0412005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Poulsen, A., 2001.
"Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model,"
Papers
01-3, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics.
- Poulsen, Anders, 2001. "Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model," Working Papers 01-3, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Maria Vittoria Levati, "undated". "Explaining Private Provision of Public Goods by Conditional Cooperation - An Evoltuionary Approach -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-44, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri & Güth, Werner & van Damme, Eric E. C., 2000.
"An experimental test of direct and indirect reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information,"
SFB 373 Discussion Papers
2000,36, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Dufwenberg, M. & Gneezy, U. & Guth, W., 2001. "An experimental test of direct and indirect reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information," Other publications TiSEM e9b108e8-6196-4403-a064-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Dufwenberg, M. & Gneezy, U. & Güth, W., 2000. "An Experimental Test of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity in Case of Complete and Incomplete Information," Other publications TiSEM dd58eedd-ce16-44e7-8f5a-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Brennan, Geoffrey & Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut, 1997. "Trust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no better," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1997,44, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Heiner, Ronald Asher & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1995. "Rational Cooperation In One-Shot Simultaneous Pd-Situations," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 95-03, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Lisa De Propris, 2001. "Systemic Flexibility, Production Fragmentation and Cluster Governance," European Planning Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(6), pages 739-753, September.
- Werner Gueth & Axel Ockenfels, 2000.
"Evolutionary Norm Enforcement,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(2), pages 335-335, June.
- Güth, Werner & Ockenfels, Axel, 1999. "Evolutionary norm enforcement," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,84, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Werner Güth & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "Evolutionary Norm Enforcement," CESifo Working Paper Series 331, CESifo.
- Matteo Ploner, 2007. "Personal Autonomy in Trust-Based Interactions. An Experimental Analysis," CEEL Working Papers 0701, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
- Ryan Murphy & Amnon Rapoport & James Parco, 2006. "The breakdown of cooperation in iterative real-time trust dilemmas," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(2), pages 147-166, June.
- Güth, Werner, 1998. "Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1998,40, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
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