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Instrument Choice when Regulators are Concerned about Resource Extinction

Author

Listed:
  • Lars Gårn Hansen

    (Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Frank Jensen

    (Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Clifford Russell

    (Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME 04011, USA
    Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37212, USA)

Abstract

In this paper we undertake a systematic investigation of instrument choice when preventing a population collapse rather than maximizing industry profit is the overriding concern. Contrary to what seems to be the general consensus we find that landing fees do provide more effective insurance against extinction than quotas under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximising industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic or precautionary principles.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars Gårn Hansen & Frank Jensen & Clifford Russell, 2011. "Instrument Choice when Regulators are Concerned about Resource Extinction," IFRO Working Paper 2011/6, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, revised Jul 2011.
    • Handle: RePEc:foi:wpaper:2011_6
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    File URL: http://okonomi.foi.dk/workingpapers/WPpdf/WP2011/WP_2011_6_instrument_choice_revised.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Weitzman, Martin L., 2002. "Landing Fees vs Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish Stocks," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 325-338, March.
    2. Rögnvaldur Hannesson & John Kenned, 2005. "Landing Fees versus Fish Quotas," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(4).
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    10. Standal, Dag, 2006. "The rise and decline of blue whiting fisheries--capacity expansion and future regulations," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 315-327, July.
    11. Lars G. Hansen & Frank Jensen & Clifford Russell, 2008. "The Choice of Regulatory Instrument When There Is Uncertainty About Compliance with Fisheries Regulations," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1130-1142.
    12. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Elleby & Frank Jensen, 2018. "How Many Instruments Do We Really Need? A First-Best Optimal Solution to Multiple Objectives with Fisheries Regulation," IFRO Working Paper 2018/05, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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