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The Choice of Regulatory Instrument When There Is Uncertainty About Compliance with Fisheries Regulations

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  • Lars G. Hansen
  • Frank Jensen
  • Clifford Russell

Abstract

Noncompliance is an important problem for fisheries regulators, and a number of studies have considered optimal enforcement issues within fisheries regulation. Our article extends this literature by studying the implications of noncompliance for the choice between tax and quota regulation. We first develop a general stock-recruitment model of a search fishery with illegal landings and show that compliance uncertainty (where the regulator is uncertain about the extent of noncompliance) generates an efficiency advantage for taxes over individual transferable quotas. We also provide evidence that uncertainty about compliance is an important source of uncertainty for regulators. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars G. Hansen & Frank Jensen & Clifford Russell, 2008. "The Choice of Regulatory Instrument When There Is Uncertainty About Compliance with Fisheries Regulations," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1130-1142.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:90:y:2008:i:4:p:1130-1142
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01169.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Vitaly G. Il’ichev & Dmitry B. Rokhlin, 2022. "Internal Prices and Optimal Exploitation of Natural Resources," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-14, May.
    2. Frank Jensen & Lars Gårn Hansen, 2017. "The welfare gain from switching to tax regulation of fisheries," IFRO Working Paper 2017/07, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    3. Hansen, Lars Gårn & Jensen, Frank, 2017. "Regulating fisheries under uncertainty," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 164-177.
    4. Lars Gårn Hansen, 2012. "Regulating Renewable Resources under Uncertainty," IFRO Working Paper 2012/3, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    5. Jensen, Frank, 2008. "Uncertainty and asymmetric information: An overview," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 89-103, January.
    6. Hansen, Lars Gårn & Jensen, Frank & Russell, Clifford, 2013. "Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 135-147.
    7. Christian Elleby & Frank Jensen, 2018. "How Many Instruments Do We Really Need? A First-Best Optimal Solution to Multiple Objectives with Fisheries Regulation," IFRO Working Paper 2018/05, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.

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