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Managing partially protected resources under uncertainty

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  • Fischer, Carolyn
  • Laxminarayan, Ramanan

Abstract

It is common wisdom that open-access leads to the inefficient use of resources and private ownership of resources improves efficiency. However, the impact of enclosure and efficient management of some resource pools on other open-access resource pools is poorly recognized. The problem is common to many congestion-prone facilities including roads, parks, fisheries, antibiotics, grazing lands and wilderness areas. In this paper, we analyze the optimality of price and quantity instruments in regulating resource use when there is uncertainty about congestion costs. Price instruments are found to be preferable to quantity instruments, and strictly so when demand is less than perfectly elastic. We also explore the effect of market power by resource owners on the relative efficiency of the two instruments.

Suggested Citation

  • Fischer, Carolyn & Laxminarayan, Ramanan, 2010. "Managing partially protected resources under uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 129-141, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:59:y:2010:i:2:p:129-141
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    Cited by:

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    2. Costello, Christopher & Quérou, Nicolas & Tomini, Agnes, 2015. "Partial enclosure of the commons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 69-78.
    3. Hughes, Jonathan E. & Kaffine, Daniel, 2017. "When is increasing consumption of common property optimal? Sorting, congestion and entry in the commons," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 227-242.
    4. Isaksen, Elisabeth Thuestad & Richter, Andries, 2019. "Tragedy, property rights, and the commons: investigating the causal relationship from institutions to ecosystem collapse," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90606, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Jonathan E. Hughes & Daniel Kaffine, 2013. "When is Encouraging Consumption of Common Property Second Best? Sorting, Congestion and Entry in the Commons," Working Papers 2013-05, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business.
    6. Hansen, Lars Gårn & Jensen, Frank & Russell, Clifford, 2013. "Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 135-147.

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    Keywords

    Regulation Congestion Taxes Quotas;

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