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Ties that Bind:How business connections affect mutual fund activism

Author

Listed:
  • Dragana Cvijanovic
  • Amil Dasgupta
  • Konstantinos Zachariadis

Abstract

We investigate how business ties with portfolio firms influence mutual funds’ proxy voting using a comprehensive dataset spanning 2003 to 2011. In sharp contrast to the prior literature, we show that the proxy voting of mutual funds is significantly influenced by their business ties with portfolio firms. Our result holds at the level of individual proposals after robustly controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across firms and fund families and over time as well as for the e?ects of ISS recommendations and fund family holdings. We also show that the influence of business ties on proxy voting is strongest for highly contested shareholder proposals where proxy votes are most relevant for firm value. Finally, we show that the prominent class action lawsuits of 2006 against 401(K) sponsors and providers had di?erential e?ects on the voting of di?erent fund families depending on whether they were sued, thus unearthing a potential link between investor attention and corporate governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Dragana Cvijanovic & Amil Dasgupta & Konstantinos Zachariadis, 2014. "Ties that Bind:How business connections affect mutual fund activism," FMG Discussion Papers dp731, Financial Markets Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp731
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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