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The perils of nominal targets

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  • Roc Armenter

Abstract

A monetary authority can be committed to pursuing an inflation, price-level, or nominal output target yet systematically fail to achieve the specified goals. Constrained by the zero lower bound on the policy rate, the monetary authority is unable to implement its objectives when private-sector expectations stray away from the target in the first place. Low-inflation expectations become self-fulfilling, leading to multiple Markov equilibria. Private-sector expectations are anchored on a unique Markov equilibrium if the monetary authority is given a strong stabilization goal for the policy rate. However, policy-rate stabilization may not improve welfare as the resulting policy is severely distorted.

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  • Roc Armenter, 2013. "The perils of nominal targets," Working Papers 14-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:14-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Tom D. Holden, 2023. "Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions to Dynamic Models with Occasionally Binding Constraints," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1481-1499, November.
    3. Silvio Contessi & Pierangelo De Pace & Li Li, 2014. "An international perspective on the recent behavior of inflation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 96(3), pages 267-294.
    4. Ragna Alstadheim & Øistein Røisland, 2017. "When Preferences for a Stable Interest Rate Become Self‐Defeating," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(2-3), pages 393-415, March.
    5. Jeffrey Campbell & Jacob Weber, 2021. "Discretion rather than rules: Equilibrium uniqueness and forward guidance with inconsistent optimal plans," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 41, pages 243-254, July.
    6. S Borağan Aruoba & Pablo Cuba-Borda & Frank Schorfheide, 2018. "Macroeconomic Dynamics Near the ZLB: A Tale of Two Countries," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(1), pages 87-118.
    7. Timothy S. Hills & Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt, 2016. "The Risky Steady State and the Interest Rate Lower Bound," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-9, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Nakata, Taisuke, 2016. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with occasionally binding zero bound constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 220-240.
    9. Nakata, Taisuke & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2019. "Conservatism and liquidity traps," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 37-47.
    10. Taisuke Nakata, 2018. "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 252-268, April.
    11. Michael Ehrmann, 2015. "Targeting Inflation from Below: How Do Inflation Expectations Behave?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(4), pages 213-249, September.
    12. Brendon, Charles & Ellison, Martin, 2018. "Time-consistently undominated policies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87176, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Taisuke Nakata, 2018. "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 252-268, April.
    14. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2016. "Sluggish Inflation Expectations: A Markov Chain Analysis," NBER Working Papers 22009, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Fernando M. Duarte & Anna Zabai, 2015. "An interest rate rule to uniquely implement the optimal equilibrium in a liquidity trap," Staff Reports 745, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nominal targets; Monetary authority; Markov equilibria;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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