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The executive toolbox: building legislative support in a multiparty presidential regime

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  • Pereira, Carlos
  • Power, Timothy J.
  • Raile, Eric D.

Abstract

How do presidents win legislative support under conditions of extreme multipartism? Comparative presidential research has offered two parallel answers, one relying on distributive politics and the other claiming that legislative success is a function of coalition formation. We merge these insights in an integrated approach to executive-legislative relations, also adding contextual factors related to dynamism and bargaining conditions. We find that the two presidential 'tools' – pork and coalition goods – are substitutable resources, with pork functioning as a fine-tuning instrument that interacts reciprocally with legislative support. Pork expenditures also depend upon a president’s bargaining leverage and the distribution of legislative seats.

Suggested Citation

  • Pereira, Carlos & Power, Timothy J. & Raile, Eric D., 2010. "The executive toolbox: building legislative support in a multiparty presidential regime," Textos para discussão 235, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
    • Handle: RePEc:fgv:eesptd:235
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Pablo T. Spiller & Ernesto H. Stein & Mariano Tommasi & Carlos Scartascini & Lee J. Alston & Marcus André Melo & Bernardo Mueller & Carlos Pereira & Cristóbal Aninat & John Londregan & Patricio Navia , 2008. "Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 40178 edited by Ernesto H. Stein & Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller & Carlos Scartascini, February.
    3. Spiller, Pablo T. & Stein, Ernesto H. & Tommasi, Mariano & Scartascini, Carlos & Alston, Lee J. & Melo, Marcus André & Mueller, Bernardo & Pereira, Carlos & Aninat, Cristóbal & Londregan, John & Navia, 2008. "Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 329, November.
    4. Lee J. Alston & Bernardo Mueller, 2006. "Pork for Policy: Executive and Legislative Exchange in Brazil," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 87-114, April.
    5. Cheibub, José Antonio & Przeworski, Adam & Saiegh, Sebastian M., 2004. "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 565-587, October.
    6. repec:idb:brikps:40178 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Baron, David P & Ferejohn, John, 1987. "Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 303-309, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aquino, André Carlos Busanelli de & Batley, Richard A., 2022. "Pathways to hybridization: Assimilation and accommodation of public financial reforms in Brazil," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).

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