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Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric

Author

Listed:
  • Vassiliki Manoussi

    (Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies)

  • Anastasios Xepapadeas

    (Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies)

Abstract

We study a dynamic game of climate policy design in terms of emissions and solar radiation management (SRM) involving two heterogeneous regions or countries. Countries emit greenhouse gasses (GHGs), and can block incoming radiation by unilateral SRM activities, thus reducing global temperature. Heterogeneity is modelled in terms of the social cost of SRM, the environmental damages due to global warming, the productivity of emissions in terms of generating private benefits, the rate of impatience, and the private cost of geoengineering. We determine the impact of asymmetry on mitigation and SRM activities, concentration of GHGs, and global temperature, and we examine whether a trade-off actually emerges between mitigation and SRM. Our results could provide some insights into a currently emerging debate regarding mitigation and SRM methods to control climate change, especially since asymmetries seem to play an important role in affecting incentives for cooperation or unilateral actions.

Suggested Citation

  • Vassiliki Manoussi & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2014. "Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric," Working Papers 2014.101, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2014.101
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emmerling, Johannes & Tavoni, Massimo, 2013. "Geoengineering and Abatement: A “flat” Relationship under Uncertainty," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 148917, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    2. Vasiliki Manousi & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2013. "Mitigation and Solar Radiation Management in Climate Change Policies," Working Papers 2013.41, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Moreno-Cruz, Juan B., 2015. "Mitigation and the geoengineering threat," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 248-263.
    4. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
    5. Juan Moreno-Cruz & David Keith, 2013. "Climate policy under uncertainty: a case for solar geoengineering," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 431-444, December.
    6. Brock, William & Engström, Gustav & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 2014. "Spatial climate-economic models in the design of optimal climate policies across locations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 78-103.
    7. Scott Barrett, 2008. "The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(1), pages 45-54, January.
    8. List, John A. & Mason, Charles F., 2001. "Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 277-296, November.
    9. Brock, William A. & Engström, Gustav & Grass, Dieter & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 2013. "Energy balance climate models and general equilibrium optimal mitigation policies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2371-2396.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Emmerling & Vassiliki Manoussi & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2016. "Climate Engineering under Deep Uncertainty and Heterogeneity," Working Papers 2016.52, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Heyen, Daniel, 2015. "Strategic Conflicts on the Horizon: R&D Incentives for Environmental Technologies," Working Papers 0584, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    3. Heyen, Daniel & Horton, Joshua & Moreno-Cruz, Juan, 2019. "Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering: Clash or cooperation?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 153-177.
    4. Daniel Heyen, 2016. "Strategic Conflicts On The Horizon: R&D Incentives For Environmental Technologies," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 1-27, November.
    5. Anastasios Xepapadeas & Athanasios Yannacopoulos, 2018. "Spatially Structured Deep Uncertainty, Robust Control, and Climate Change Policies," DEOS Working Papers 1807, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    6. Johannes Emmerling & Massimo Tavoni, 2017. "Quantifying Non-cooperative Climate Engineering," Working Papers 2017.58, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    7. Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet & Céline Guivarch, 2018. "Asymmetric impacts and over-provision of public goods," CIRED Working Papers hal-01960318, HAL.
    8. Heyen, Daniel, 2016. "Strategic conflicts on the horizon: R&D incentives for environmental technologies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68104, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Manoussi, Vassiliki & Xepapadeas, Anastasios & Emmerling, Johannes, 2018. "Climate engineering under deep uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 207-224.
    10. repec:sae:envval:v:25:y:2016:i:1:p:29-49 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate Change; Mitigation; Solar Radiation Management; Cooperation; Differential Game; Asymmetry; Feedback Nash Equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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