IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fem/femwpa/2007.100.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Computational Difficulty of Bribery in Qualitative Coalitional Games

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew Dowell

    (University of Liverpool)

  • Michael Wooldridge

    (University of Liverpool)

  • Peter McBurney

    (University of Liverpool)

Abstract

Qualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of the agents to find the best coalition to join. Previous work into QCGs has investigated the computational complexity of determining which is the best coalition to join. We plan to expand on this work by investigating the computational complexity of computing agent power in QCGs as well as by showing that insincere strategies, particularly bribery, are possible when the envy-freeness assumption is removed but that it is computationally difficult to identify the best agents to bribe.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Dowell & Michael Wooldridge & Peter McBurney, 2007. "The Computational Difficulty of Bribery in Qualitative Coalitional Games," Working Papers 2007.100, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.100
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://feem-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/NDL2007-100.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Prasad, K & Kelly, J S, 1990. "NP-Completeness of Some Problems Concerning Voting Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(1), pages 1-9.
    2. Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 2002. "An Experimental Bribery Game," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 428-454, October.
    3. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
    4. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
    5. M Sáiz & Eligius Hendrix & Niels Olieman, 2006. "On the Computation of Stability in Multiple Coalition Formation Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(3), pages 251-275, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dowell, Andrew J. & Wooldridge, Michael & McBurney, Peter, 2007. "The Computational Difficulty of Bribery in Qualitative Coalitional Games," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 7444, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    2. Laurent, Thibault & Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & de Mouzon, Olivier, 2017. "Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective," TSE Working Papers 17-861, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2018.
    3. Pavel Doležel, 2011. "Optimizing the Efficiency of Weighted Voting Games," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 306-323, November.
    4. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, March.
    5. Berghammer, Rudolf & Bolus, Stefan & Rusinowska, Agnieszka & de Swart, Harrie, 2011. "A relation-algebraic approach to simple games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 210(1), pages 68-80, April.
    6. Stefan Ambec & Yann Kervinio, 2016. "Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 119-155, January.
    7. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1593-1623, September.
    8. Menusch Khadjavi, 2018. "Deterrence works for criminals," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 165-178, August.
    9. Elke Renner, 2004. "Wie lässt sich Korruption wirksam bekämpfen?: Empirische Befunde aus der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(2), pages 292-300.
    10. Horn, Henrik & Persson, Lars, 2001. "Endogenous mergers in concentrated markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1213-1244, September.
    11. Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, 2007. "Endogenous coalition formation in contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(2), pages 139-163, September.
    12. Monisankar Bishnu & Sonali Roy, 2012. "Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 11-22, January.
    13. Thoron, Sylvie & Sol, Emmanuel & Willinger, Marc, 2009. "Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1271-1282, December.
    14. Zaporozhets, Vera & García-Valiñas, María & Kurz, Sascha, 2016. "Key drivers of EU budget allocation: Does power matter?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 57-70.
    15. Doyen, Luc & Péreau, Jean-Christophe, 2012. "Sustainable coalitions in the commons," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 57-64.
    16. Bich, Philippe & Teteryatnikova, Mariya, 2023. "On perfect pairwise stable networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    17. Grabisch, Michel & Rusinowska, Agnieszka, 2011. "Influence functions, followers and command games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 123-138, May.
    18. Vetter, Stefan, 2013. "Delegating decision rights for anticipated rewards as an alternative to corruption: An experiment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 188-204.
    19. Simon G�chter & Ernst Fehr, "undated". "Fairness in the Labour Market � A Survey of Experimental Results," IEW - Working Papers 114, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    20. Martí Jané Ballarín, 2023. "The complexity of power indices in voting games with incompatible players," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2023/441, University of Barcelona School of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bribery; Coalition Formation; Computational Complexity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.100. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alberto Prina Cerai The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Alberto Prina Cerai to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feemmit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.