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Ownership and Control in the Netherlands

Author

Listed:
  • Abe de Jongand

    (Tilburg University, The Netherlands)

  • Rezaul Kabir

    (Tilburg University, The Netherlands)

  • Teye Marra

    (Tilburg University, The Netherlands)

  • Ailsa Roell

    (Tilburg University, The Netherlands and Princeton University, USA)

Abstract

This paper analyses ownership and control structures of Dutch listed companies. Legislation effective since 1992 mandates all shareholders with holdings of 5 percent or more in Dutch companies to disclose their holdings. Our analysis shows that the average ownership stakes of the largest and the three largest shareholders are 27% and 41%, respectively. The average ownership stakes of banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions are relatively low. We observe that voting rights are more concentrated than ownership rights; the use of a supervisory board representing interests of different stakeholders is ubiquitous; and listed companies use different forms of antitakeover defence measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Abe de Jongand & Rezaul Kabir & Teye Marra & Ailsa Roell, 1999. "Ownership and Control in the Netherlands," Working Papers 1999.22, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:1999.22
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rezaul Kabir & Dolph Cantrijn & Andreas Jeunink, 1997. "Takeover Defenses, Ownership Structure And Stock Returns In The Netherlands: An Empirical Analysis," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 97-109, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Crespi, R. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2000. "United we stand : Corporate Monitoring by Shareholder Coalitions in the UK," Discussion Paper 2000-18, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Cools, Kees & Mirjam van Praag, C., 2007. "The value relevance of top executive departures: Evidence from the Netherlands," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 721-742, December.
    3. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2010. "Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism," NBER Working Papers 16490, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Randall Morck & Michael Percy & Gloria Tian & Bernard Yeung, 2005. "The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm: A History of Corporate Ownership in Canada," NBER Chapters, in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 65-148, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Chirinko Robert & Garretsen Harry & Ees Hans van & Sterken Elmer, 2004. "Investor Protections and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in the Netherlands," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 119-138, May.
    6. Degryse, Hans & de Jong, Abe, 2006. "Investment and internal finance: Asymmetric information or managerial discretion?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 125-147, January.
    7. Köhler, Matthias, 2008. "Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-110, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    8. Klaus Gugler, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Structure in Austria," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 25(3), pages 285-307, January.
    9. de Jong, A., 2001. "The Disciplining Role of Leverage in Dutch Firms," Discussion Paper 2001-48, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    10. Dong, Ming & Robinson, Chris & Veld, Chris, 2005. "Why individual investors want dividends," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 121-158, December.
    11. Yoser Gadhoum, 2006. "Power of Ultimate Controlling Owners: A Survey of Canadian Landscape," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(2), pages 179-204, May.
    12. de Jong, A. & van der Poel, A.M. & Wolfswinkel, M., 2007. "Corporate Governance and Acquisitions: Acquirer Wealth Effects in the Netherlands," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2007-016-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    13. de Jong, A., 2001. "The Disciplining Role of Leverage in Dutch Firms," Other publications TiSEM 940ddf9b-7e19-460c-be52-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Köhler, Matthias, 2009. "Blockholdings and corporate governance in the EU banking sector," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-110 [rev.], ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    15. Becht, Marco, 1999. "European corporate governance: Trading off liquidity against control," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 1071-1083, April.
    16. Becht, Marco & Roell, Ailsa, 1999. "Blockholdings in Europe:: An international comparison1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 1049-1056, April.
    17. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Fan, Joseph P.H. & Lang, Larry H.P., 2000. "Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia," CEI Working Paper Series 2000-4, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    18. Matthias Köhler, 2012. "Ownership structure, regulation and the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 173-196, August.
    19. Abdallah, Wissam & Goergen, Marc, 2008. "Does corporate control determine the cross-listing location?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 183-199, June.
    20. Crama, Y. & Leruth, L. & Renneboog, L.D.R. & Urbain, J-P., 1999. "Corporate Governance Structures, Control and Performance in European Markets : A Tale of Two Systems," Discussion Paper 1999-97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    21. Crama, Y. & Leruth, L. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2003. "Corporate control concentration measurement and firm performance," Other publications TiSEM 3701bf7b-3df8-4f01-8bdf-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    22. Hans van Ees & Theo J.B.M. Postma & Elmer Sterken, 2003. "Board Characteristics and Corporate Performance in the Netherlands," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 29(1), pages 41-58, Winter.
    23. de Jong, Abe & DeJong, Douglas V. & Mertens, Gerard & Wasley, Charles E., 2005. "The role of self-regulation in corporate governance: evidence and implications from The Netherlands," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 473-503, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ownership; Control; Corporate governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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