IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ems/eureri/147.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?

Author

Listed:
  • Degryse, H.
  • de Jong, A.

Abstract

This paper examines the relation between cash-flow availability and investment spending in the Netherlands. In particular, we are interested whether managerial discretion and/or asymmetric information drive the positive relation between cash-flow and investment spending. This relation is positive for both firms with low and high investment opportunities. It is however significantly larger for firms with low investment opportunities suggesting that the managerial-discretion problem is most important in the Dutch setting. Effective corporate-governance may reduce this agency problem. Specific to the Netherlands, firms with low shareholder influence posit a higher cash-flow-investment sensitivity. The relevance of asymmetric information is confirmed as smaller firms and firms from information-sensitive industries show a larger cash-flow-investment sensitivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Degryse, H. & de Jong, A., 2001. "Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2001-86-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    • Handle: RePEc:ems:eureri:147
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repub.eur.nl/pub/147/erimrs20020119123856.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ees, Hans Van & Garretsen, Harry, 1994. "Liquidity and business investment: Evidence from dutch panel data," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 613-627.
    2. Barca, Fabrizio & Becht, Marco (ed.), 2001. "The Control of Corporate Europe," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247424.
    3. Gilchrist, Simon & Himmelberg, Charles P., 1995. "Evidence on the role of cash flow for investment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 541-572, December.
    4. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    5. Steven M. Fazzari & Bruce C. Petersen, 1993. "Working Capital and Fixed Investment: New Evidence on Financing Constraints," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(3), pages 328-342, Autumn.
    6. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Enrica Detragiache & Paolo Garella & Luigi Guiso, 2000. "Multiple versus Single Banking Relationships: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(3), pages 1133-1161, June.
    8. Timothy Erickson & Toni M. Whited, 2000. "Measurement Error and the Relationship between Investment and q," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 1027-1057, October.
    9. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    10. Charles J. Hadlock, 1998. "Ownership, Liquidity, and Investment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(3), pages 487-508, Autumn.
    11. Steven M. Fazzari & R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Petersen, 1988. "Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(1), pages 141-206.
    12. Audretsch, David B. & Elston, Julie Ann, 2002. "Does firm size matter? Evidence on the impact of liquidity constraints on firm investment behavior in Germany," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-17, January.
    13. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    14. Rezaul Kabir & Dolph Cantrijn & Andreas Jeunink, 1997. "Takeover Defenses, Ownership Structure And Stock Returns In The Netherlands: An Empirical Analysis," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 97-109, February.
    15. Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, 2002. "Corporate control in Europe," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 112(4), pages 471-498.
    16. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    17. Chirinko, Robert S & Schaller, Huntley, 1995. "Why Does Liquidity Matter in Investment Equations?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(2), pages 527-548, May.
    18. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1991. "Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60.
    19. Sean Cleary, 1999. "The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 673-692, April.
    20. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    21. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    22. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    23. Greenwald, Bruce & Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1984. "Informational Imperfections in the Capital Market and Macroeconomic Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 194-199, May.
    24. Audretsch, David B. & Elston, Julie Ann, 2002. "Does firm size matter? Evidence on the impact of liquidity constraints on firm investment behavior in Germany," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-17, January.
    25. Michael Devereux & Fabio Schiantarelli, 1990. "Investment, Financial Factors, and Cash Flow: Evidence from U.K. Panel Data," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 279-306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    26. Steven M. Fazzari & R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Petersen, 2000. "Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities are Useful: A Comment on Kaplan and Zingales," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(2), pages 695-705.
    27. Stephen Bond & Costas Meghir, 1994. "Dynamic Investment Models and the Firm's Financial Policy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(2), pages 197-222.
    28. repec:dgr:uvatin:20020072 is not listed on IDEAS
    29. Chirinko Robert & Garretsen Harry & Ees Hans van & Sterken Elmer, 2004. "Investor Protections and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in the Netherlands," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 119-138, May.
    30. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    31. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:5:p:2061-2092 is not listed on IDEAS
    32. de Jong, Abe & DeJong, Douglas V. & Mertens, Gerard & Wasley, Charles E., 2005. "The role of self-regulation in corporate governance: evidence and implications from The Netherlands," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 473-503, June.
    33. Steven N. Kaplan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Are Not Valid Measures of Financing Constraints," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(2), pages 707-712.
    34. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-659, September.
    35. Abe de Jongand & Rezaul Kabir & Teye Marra & Ailsa Roell, 1999. "Ownership and Control in the Netherlands," Working Papers 1999.22, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    36. Gorton, Gary & Schmid, Frank A., 2000. "Universal banking and the performance of German firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 29-80.
    37. Aydoḡan Alti, 2003. "How Sensitive Is Investment to Cash Flow When Financing Is Frictionless?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 707-722, April.
    38. Stephen C. Vogt, 1994. "The Cash Flow/investment Relationship: Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing Firms," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 23(2), Summer.
    39. Fama, Eugene F., 1985. "What's different about banks?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-39, January.
    40. Allayannis, George & Mozumdar, Abon, 2004. "The impact of negative cash flow and influential observations on investment-cash flow sensitivity estimates," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 901-930, May.
    41. Perfect, Steven B. & Wiles, Kenneth W., 1994. "Alternative constructions of Tobin's q: An empirical comparison," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 313-341, July.
    42. Colin Mayer, 1990. "Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 307-332, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    43. Oliner, Stephen D & Rudebusch, Glenn D, 1992. "Sources of the Financing Hierarchy for Business Investment," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(4), pages 643-654, November.
    44. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    45. Marco Becht & Fabrizio Barca, 2001. "The control of corporate Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13302, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    46. Pound, John, 1988. "Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 237-265, January.
    47. de Haan, Leo & Hinloopen, Jeroen, 2003. "Preference hierarchies for internal finance, bank loans, bond, and share issues: evidence for Dutch firms," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(5), pages 661-681, December.
    48. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Dynamic Capital Structure under Managerial Entrenchment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1197-1215, December.
    49. Whited, Toni M, 1998. "Why Do Investment Euler Equations Fail?," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 16(4), pages 479-488, October.
    50. Joao F. Gomes, 2001. "Financing Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1263-1285, December.
    51. R. Glenn Hubbard & Anil K. Kashyap & Toni M. Whited, 1993. "Internal Finance and Firm Investment," NBER Working Papers 4392, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    52. Hayashi, Fumio, 1982. "Tobin's Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 213-224, January.
    53. de Jong, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Mertens, G.M.H. & Wasley, C., 2001. "The Role of Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2001-87-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    54. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-1400, September.
    55. Steven N. Kaplan & Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 169-215.
    56. Kadapakkam, Palani-Rajan & Kumar, P. C. & Riddick, Leigh A., 1998. "The impact of cash flows and firm size on investment: The international evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 293-320, March.
    57. de Jong, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Mertens, G.M.H. & Roosenboom, P.G.J., 2005. "Royal Ahold: A Failure Of Corporate Governance," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2005-002-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Joanna Tyrowicz, 2007. "Blame No One ?Investment Decisions of the Polish Stock-Listed Companies," Brussels Economic Review, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 50(4), pages 391-410.
    2. Coad, Alex, 2010. "Neoclassical vs evolutionary theories of financial constraints: Critique and prospectus," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 206-218, August.
    3. Gaurav Gupta & Jitendra Mahakud, 2019. "Alternative measure of financial development and investment-cash flow sensitivity: evidence from an emerging economy," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 5(1), pages 1-28, December.
    4. Jean-Bernard Chatelain, 2003. "Structural modelling of financial constraints on investment: where do we stand?," Chapters, in: Paul Butzen & Catherine Fuss (ed.), Firms’ Investment and Finance Decisions, chapter 2, pages 40-58, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Goergen, Marc & Renneboog, Luc, 2001. "Investment policy, internal financing and ownership concentration in the UK," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 257-284, September.
    6. Valentina Peruzzi, 2017. "Does family ownership structure affect investment-cash flow sensitivity? Evidence from Italian SMEs," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(43), pages 4378-4393, September.
    7. Behr Andreas, 2005. "Investment, Q and Liquidity / Investitionen, Q und Liquidität: Evidence for Germany Using Firm Level Balance Sheet Data / Empirische Ergebnisse auf Basis von Unternehmensdaten," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 225(1), pages 2-21, February.
    8. Carpenter, Robert E. & Guariglia, Alessandra, 2008. "Cash flow, investment, and investment opportunities: New tests using UK panel data," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(9), pages 1894-1906, September.
    9. Grzegorz Pawlina & Luc Renneboog, 2005. "Is Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 11(4), pages 483-513, September.
    10. Stein, Jeremy C., 2003. "Agency, information and corporate investment," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 111-165, Elsevier.
    11. Chen, Alex A. & Cao, Hong & Zhang, Dayong & Dickinson, David G., 2013. "The impact of shareholding structure on firm investment: Evidence from Chinese listed companies," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 85-100.
    12. Mykhayliv, Dariya & Zauner, Klaus G., 2013. "Investment behavior and ownership structures in Ukraine: Soft budget constraints, government ownership and private benefits of control," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 265-278.
    13. Vijayakumaran, Ratnam, 2021. "Impact of managerial ownership on investment and liquidity constraints: Evidence from Chinese listed companies," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    14. Tumer-Alkan, G., 2008. "Essays on banking," Other publications TiSEM 8d5ec521-4702-4e75-bc79-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    15. Degryse, H.A. & de Jong, A., 2000. "Investment Spending in the Netherlands : The Impact of Liquidity and Corporate Governance," Other publications TiSEM 031a2179-910f-47da-a339-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. Carlos Carreira & Filipe Silva, 2010. "No Deep Pockets: Some Stylized Empirical Results On Firms’ Financial Constraints," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 731-753, September.
    17. Kadapakkam, Palani-Rajan & Kumar, P. C. & Riddick, Leigh A., 1998. "The impact of cash flows and firm size on investment: The international evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 293-320, March.
    18. Manzur Quader & Karl Taylor, 2018. "Corporate efficiency, credit status and investment," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(6), pages 439-457, April.
    19. Klaus Gugler, 2003. "Corporate governance and investment," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 261-289.
    20. Hönig, Anja, 2012. "Financing Constraints Revisited - Is there a Role for Taxation and Internal Funds?," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 66053, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Investment; The Netherlands; asymmetric information; financial constraints; managerial discretion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ems:eureri:147. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: RePub (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/erimanl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.