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Power of Ultimate Controlling Owners: A Survey of Canadian Landscape

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  • Yoser Gadhoum

Abstract

This study highlights the ownership structure of 1120 Canadian listed firms. The chains of ownership and control are traced back to the ultimate controlling owners, and related to some corporate features. Families are the most prevalent type of controlling shareholder. Pyramids, multiple classes of shares and cross-holdings are used to gain control, and hence, a significant separation of ownership and control is achieved. The study also provides some evidence that the role of the second ultimate owners, which is to weaken the channels that lead to expropriation, is not effective in Canada. The findings are compared to those of previous empirical ownership studies on the US, Western Europe and East Asia. Copyright Springer 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Yoser Gadhoum, 2006. "Power of Ultimate Controlling Owners: A Survey of Canadian Landscape," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 10(2), pages 179-204, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:179-204
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-006-0004-0
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    15. Randall Morck & Lloyd Steier, 2005. "The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction," NBER Chapters, in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 1-64, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Randall Morck, 2009. "The Riddle of the Great Pyramids," NBER Working Papers 14858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Paligorova, Teodora & Xu, Zhaoxia, 2012. "Complex ownership and capital structure," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 701-716.
    4. Jean Bédard & Daniel Coulombe & Lucie Courteau, 2008. "Audit Committee, Underpricing of IPOs, and Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(6), pages 519-535, November.
    5. Kryzanowski, Lawrence & Zhang, Ying, 2013. "Financial restatements and Sarbanes–Oxley: Impact on Canadian firm governance and management turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 87-105.
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    7. Lin, Hsiao-Mei & Fok, Robert (Chi-Wing) & Yang, Shih-An & Chang, Yuanchen, 2016. "The wealth effects of oil-related name changes on stock prices: Evidence from the U.S. and Canadian stock markets," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 26-45.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ownership structure; shareholder protection; voting rights; G32;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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