Risk Management and Public Policies: How prevention challenges monopolistic insurance markets
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More about this item
Keywords
self-insurance; insurance; monopoly; compulsory insurance; public regulation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2024-05-06 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2024-05-06 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2024-05-06 (Regulation)
- NEP-RMG-2024-05-06 (Risk Management)
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