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The Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Japan's Small Business Loan Market

Author

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  • Arito Ono
  • Iichiro Uesugi

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of collateral and personal guarantees in small business lending using the unique data set of Japan's small business loan market. Consistent with conventional theory, collateral is more likely to be pledged by riskier borrowers, implying they may be useful in mitigating debtor moral hazard. Contrary to conventional theory, we find that banks whose claims are either collateralized or personally guaranteed monitor borrowers more frequently. We also find that borrowers who establish long-term relationships with their main banks are more likely to pledge collateral. Our empirical evidence thus suggests that collateral and personal guarantees are complementary to relationship lending.

Suggested Citation

  • Arito Ono & Iichiro Uesugi, 2005. "The Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Japan's Small Business Loan Market," Discussion papers 05027, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    • Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:05027
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Gambini & Alberto Zazzaro, 2013. "Long-lasting bank relationships and growth of firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 977-1007, May.
    2. Li, Jiaming & Lin, Xiaohua, 2017. "Assessing credit guarantee companies in China: Applying a new framework," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 98-111.
    3. Giorgio Calcagnini & Fabio Farabullini & Germana Giombini, 2009. "Loans, Interest Rates and Guarantees: Is There a Link?," Working Papers 0904, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2009.
    4. Arroyo, Martín R., 2007. "Banking concentration, information asymmetries and credit rationing: The Argentinean case," MPRA Paper 29968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Mar 2011.
    5. Bellucci, Andrea & Borisov, Alexander & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2013. "Do banks price discriminate spatially? Evidence from small business lending in local credit markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4183-4197.
    6. Karel Janda, 2009. "Bankruptcies With Soft Budget Constraint," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(4), pages 430-460, July.
    7. Berger, Allen N. & Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. & Frame, W. Scott & Miller, Nathan H., 2011. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    8. Bellucci, Andrea & Borisov, Alexander & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2010. "Does gender matter in bank-firm relationships? Evidence from small business lending," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(12), pages 2968-2984, December.
    9. Hirofumi Uchida & Gregory F. Udell & Nobuyoshi Yamori, 2006. "SME financing and the choice of lending technology," Discussion papers 06025, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    10. Uesugi, Iichiro & 植杉, 威一郎 & ウエスギ, イイチロウ, 2008. "Efficiency of Credit Allocation and Effectiveness of Government Credit Guarantees: Evidence from Japanese Small Businesses," PIE/CIS Discussion Paper 353, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    11. Cadot, Julien, 2013. "Collateral, bank monitoring and firm performance: the case of newly established wine farmers," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 57(3).
    12. Uchida, Hirofumi & Udell, Gregory F. & Watanabe, Wako, 2008. "Bank size and lending relationships in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 242-267, June.
    13. Kenshi Taketa & Gregory F. Udell, 2007. "Lending Channels and Financial Shocks: The Case of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Trade Credit and the Japanese Banking Crisis," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 25(2), pages 1-44, November.
    14. Cadot, Julien, 2013. "Contrat bancaire et monitoring : le cas de l’installation en viticulture," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 336(July-Augu).
    15. Cadot, Julien, 2011. "Collaterals, Bank Monitoring and Performance: the Case of Newly Established Wine Farmers," 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 103414, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    16. Amedeo Argentiero, 2009. "Some New Evidence on the Role of Collateral: Lazy Banks or Diligent Banks?," ISAE Working Papers 113, ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics - (Rome, ITALY).
    17. Kazuo Ogawa & Elmer Sterken & Ichiro Tokutsu, 2010. "Multiple Bank Relationships and the Main Bank System: Evidence from a Matched Sample of Japanese Small Firms and Main Banks," Contributions to Economics, in: Giorgio Calcagnini & Enrico Saltari (ed.), The Economics of Imperfect Markets, chapter 0, pages 73-90, Springer.
    18. HOSONO Kaoru & XU Peng, 2009. "Do Banks Have Private Information? Bank screening and ex-post small firm performance," Discussion papers 09016, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

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