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Banking concentration, information asymmetries and credit rationing: The Argentinean case

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  • Arroyo, Martín R.

Abstract

This paper highlights the importance of the information efficiency in the banking sector as a way to ensure his correct operation as financial intermediary and the correct functioning of the economy in general. The problems of information in the banks distort their relation with the financing demand and especially with the sector of the SMEs, what really means an important obstacle for the smooth operation of any market system. The analysis is centred in the relative size of the financial institutions, the generation of different types of information and the way how it affects the sector of the SMEs. By means of empirical evidence we will show how the greater size of the banks has influence on the creation of information systems that are not well adapted for some segments of the demand or even they do not generate information at all.

Suggested Citation

  • Arroyo, Martín R., 2007. "Banking concentration, information asymmetries and credit rationing: The Argentinean case," MPRA Paper 29968, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Mar 2011.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29968
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61481/1/MPRA_paper_61481.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arito Ono & Iichiro Uesugi, 2005. "The Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Japan's Small Business Loan Market," Discussion papers 05027, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    2. Bebczuk,Ricardo N., 2003. "Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521793421, January.
    3. George Kanatas & Jianping Qi, 2004. "Dividends and Debt with Managerial Agency and Lender Holdup," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(9), pages 1249-1260, September.
    4. Yoshiaki Ogura & Hirofumi Uchida, 2014. "Bank Consolidation and Soft Information Acquisition in Small Business Lending," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 173-200, April.
    5. Kanatas, George & Qi, Jianping, 1998. "Underwriting by Commercial Banks: Incentive Conflicts, Scope Economies, and Project Quality," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(1), pages 119-133, February.
    6. Jaffee, Dwight & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1990. "Credit rationing," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 16, pages 837-888, Elsevier.
    7. Jonathan Scott, 2004. "Small Business and the Value of Community Financial Institutions," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 207-230, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit rationing; information asymmetries; banking concentration; SME; small medium size company; Argentina; credit; rationing; asymmetries; asymmetry; concentration; banking; Argentinean;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing

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