IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/conchp/978-3-7908-2131-4_4.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Multiple Bank Relationships and the Main Bank System: Evidence from a Matched Sample of Japanese Small Firms and Main Banks

In: The Economics of Imperfect Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Kazuo Ogawa

    (Osaka University)

  • Elmer Sterken

    (University of Groningen)

  • Ichiro Tokutsu

    (Kobe University)

Abstract

Based on a matched sample of Japanese small firms and main banks we investigate the bank-firm relationships in the early 2000s. We obtain new findings. First, even small firms with a main bank relation have multiple bank relationships. Second, firms tied with a financially weak main bank increase the number of bank relations. Third, longer duration of a main bank relation increases the number of bank relations. Moreover we find that firms with fewer bank relations pledge personal guarantees to their main banks and are charged a higher interest rate. This suggests that firms take actions against the monopoly power of a main bank.

Suggested Citation

  • Kazuo Ogawa & Elmer Sterken & Ichiro Tokutsu, 2010. "Multiple Bank Relationships and the Main Bank System: Evidence from a Matched Sample of Japanese Small Firms and Main Banks," Contributions to Economics, in: Giorgio Calcagnini & Enrico Saltari (ed.), The Economics of Imperfect Markets, chapter 0, pages 73-90, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:conchp:978-3-7908-2131-4_4
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7908-2131-4_4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Sheard, 1994. "Bank Executives on Japanese Corporate Boards," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 12(2), pages 85-121, December.
    2. Arito Ono & Iichiro Uesugi, 2005. "The Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Japan's Small Business Loan Market," Discussion papers 05027, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    3. Chemmanur, Thomas J & Fulghieri, Paolo, 1994. "Reputation, Renegotiation, and the Choice between Bank Loans and Publicly Traded Debt," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(3), pages 475-506.
    4. Uchida, Hirofumi & Udell, Gregory F. & Watanabe, Wako, 2008. "Bank size and lending relationships in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 242-267, June.
    5. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:2:p:635-672 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. James, Christopher, 1987. "Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 217-235, December.
    7. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    8. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-1400, September.
    9. Hausman, Jerry & Hall, Bronwyn H & Griliches, Zvi, 1984. "Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 909-938, July.
    10. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
    11. Enrica Detragiache & Paolo Garella & Luigi Guiso, 2000. "Multiple versus Single Banking Relationships: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(3), pages 1133-1161, June.
    12. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-1087, September.
    13. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1993. "The Choice Between Public and Private Debt: An Analysis of Post-Deregulation Corporate Financing in Japan," NBER Working Papers 4421, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Kang, Jun-Koo & Shivdasani, Anil, 1997. "Corporate restructuring during performance declines in Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 29-65, October.
    15. Billett, Matthew T & Flannery, Mark J & Garfinkel, Jon A, 1995. "The Effect of Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm's Equity Return," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(2), pages 699-718, June.
    16. Ongena, Steven & Smith, David C., 2000. "What Determines the Number of Bank Relationships? Cross-Country Evidence," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 26-56, January.
    17. Kaplan, Steven N. & Minton, Bernadette A., 1994. "Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 225-258, October.
    18. Kang, Jun-Koo & Shivdasani, Anil, 1995. "Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 29-58, May.
    19. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1991. "Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60.
    20. Ogawa, Kazuo & Sterken, Elmer & Tokutsu, Ichiro, 2007. "Why do Japanese firms prefer multiple bank relationship? Some evidence from firm-level data," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 49-70, March.
    21. Hoshi, Takeo & Kashyap, Anil & Scharfstein, David, 1990. "The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 67-88, September.
    22. Ongena, S. & Smith, D.C., 2000. "Bank relationships : A review," Other publications TiSEM 993b88a5-9a0f-42de-9cec-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    23. Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, 1999. "Banks and Corporate Control in Japan," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(1), pages 319-339, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kasahara, Hiroyuki & Sawada, Yasuyuki & Suzuki, Michio, 2024. "The effect of bank recapitalization policy on credit allocation, investment, and productivity: Evidence from a banking crisis in Japan," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    2. Chernobai, Anna & Yasuda, Yukihiro, 2013. "Disclosures of material weaknesses by Japanese firms after the passage of the 2006 Financial Instruments and Exchange Law," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1524-1542.
    3. Uchino, Taisuke, 2013. "Bank dependence and financial constraints on investment: Evidence from the corporate bond market paralysis in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 74-97.
    4. XU Peng, 2017. "Bank-Firm Relationship and Small Business Innovation," Discussion papers 17062, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yu, Hai-Chin & Sopranzetti, Ben J. & Lee, Cheng-Few, 2012. "Multiple banking relationships, managerial ownership concentration and firm value: A simultaneous equations approach," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 286-297.
    2. Ogawa, Kazuo & Sterken, Elmer & Tokutsu, Ichiro, 2007. "Why do Japanese firms prefer multiple bank relationship? Some evidence from firm-level data," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 49-70, March.
    3. Shin, G. Hwan & Fraser, Donald R. & Kolari, James W., 2003. "How does banking industry consolidation affect bank-firm relationships? Evidence from a large Japanese bank merger," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 285-304, July.
    4. Ongena, S. & Smith, D.C., 2000. "Bank relationships : A review," Other publications TiSEM 993b88a5-9a0f-42de-9cec-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Brewer, Elijah III & Genay, Hesna & Hunter, William Curt & Kaufman, George G., 2003. "The value of banking relationships during a financial crisis: Evidence from failures of Japanese banks," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 233-262, September.
    6. Shirasu, Yoko & Xu, Peng, 2007. "The choice of financing with public debt versus private debt: New evidence from Japan after critical binding regulations were removed," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 393-424, December.
    7. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Küllü, A. Melih & Zhou, Mingming, 2018. "Should banks diversify or focus? Know thyself: The role of abilities," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 106-118.
    8. Kazuo Ogawa & Elmer Sterken & Ichiro Tokutsu, 2005. "Bank Control and the Number of Bank Relations of Japanese Firms," CESifo Working Paper Series 1589, CESifo.
    9. Limpaphayom, Piman & Rogers, Daniel A. & Yanase, Noriyoshi, 2019. "Bank equity ownership and corporate hedging: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 765-783.
    10. Hai-Chin Yu & Ben Sopranzetti & Cheng-Few Lee, 2015. "The impact of banking relationships, managerial incentives, and board monitoring on corporate cash holdings: an emerging market perspective," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 353-378, February.
    11. Tumer-Alkan, G., 2008. "Essays on banking," Other publications TiSEM 8d5ec521-4702-4e75-bc79-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Boot, Arnoud W. A., 2000. "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 7-25, January.
    13. Aoki, Yasuharu, 2021. "The effect of bank relationships on bond spreads: Additional evidence from Japan," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    14. Steven Ongena, 1999. "Lending Relationships, Bank Default and Economic Activity," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 257-280.
    15. Yasuda, Ayako, 2007. "Bank relationships and underwriter competition: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 369-404, November.
    16. Kentaro Koga & Satomi Uchino, 2012. "Bank-Firm Relationships and Security Analyst Activities: Evidence from Japan," The Japanese Accounting Review, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, vol. 2, pages 49-73, December.
    17. Miwa, Yoshiro & Ramseyer, J. Mark, 2006. "The Fable of the Keiretsu," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226532707, September.
    18. Veronica Rappoport & Philipp Schnabl & Daniel Paravisini, 2015. "Comparative Advantage and Specialization in Bank Lending," 2015 Meeting Papers 499, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    19. Hans Degryse & Steven Ongena, 2002. "Bank-Firm Relationships and International Banking Markets," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 401-417.
    20. Chernobai, Anna & Yasuda, Yukihiro, 2013. "Disclosures of material weaknesses by Japanese firms after the passage of the 2006 Financial Instruments and Exchange Law," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1524-1542.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:conchp:978-3-7908-2131-4_4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.