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Capital-intensive projects induce more effort than labor-intensive projects

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  • Amihai GLAZER
  • Stef PROOST

Abstract

Central governments often subsidize capital spending by local governments, instead of subsidizing operating expenses or labor-intensive projects. This paper offers one explanation, focusing on the incentive effects for local officials. a local official can more easily shift the cost of optimizing a project to his successor on a labor-intensive project than on a capital-intensive project.

Suggested Citation

  • Amihai GLAZER & Stef PROOST, 2008. "Capital-intensive projects induce more effort than labor-intensive projects," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces0831, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    • Handle: RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0831
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation

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