IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/eps/cepswp/13472.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

How safe is a safe asset?

Author

Listed:
  • De Grauwe, Paul
  • Ji, Yuemei

Abstract

This contribution focuses on a recent proposal put forward by the European Systemic Risk Board to create a “safe asset” for the eurozone based on a repackaging of the risks of sovereign bonds, in the hope of stabilising an otherwise unstable system of sovereign bond markets. In the present paper, however, authors Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji argue that a financial system that is fundamentally unstable cannot be stabilised by financial engineering. To this end, they first describe the nature of the instability of the government bond markets in a monetary union and then analyse whether this proposal of creating a safe asset will succeed in stabilising government bond markets in the eurozone.

Suggested Citation

  • De Grauwe, Paul & Ji, Yuemei, 2018. "How safe is a safe asset?," CEPS Papers 13472, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:eps:cepswp:13472
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/PDG_SafeAssetEZ.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul De Grauwe, 2014. "The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Exchange Rates and Global Financial Policies, chapter 12, pages 297-320, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. De Grauwe, Paul & Ji, Yuemei, 2013. "Self-fulfilling crises in the Eurozone: An empirical test," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 15-36.
    3. Andrew W. Lo, 2012. "Reading about the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(1), pages 151-178, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Goulard Sylvie, 2020. "The international role of the euro [Le rôle international de l’euro]," Bulletin de la Banque de France, Banque de France, issue 229.
    2. Gossé Jean-Baptiste, & Anass Mourjane., 2021. "A European safe asset: new perspectives [Actif sûr européen : nouvelles perspectives]," Bulletin de la Banque de France, Banque de France, issue 234.
    3. Gandullia, Luca & Praussello, Franco, 2018. "Fixing the Eurozone Setup: On Viable Forms of Fiscal Union," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 71(3), pages 289-316.
    4. Heather D. Gibson & Stephen G. Hall & Deborah Gefang & Pavlos Petroulas & George S. Tavlas, 2020. "Did the absence of a central bank backstop in the sovereign bond markets exacerbate spillovers during the euro-area crisis?," Working Papers 281, Bank of Greece.
    5. Massimo Amato & Everardo Belloni & Paolo Falbo & Lucio Gobbi, 2021. "Europe, public debts, and safe assets: the scope for a European Debt Agency," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 38(3), pages 823-861, October.
    6. Álvaro Leandro & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2019. "Creating a Euro area safe asset without mutualizing risk (much)," Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 488-517.
    7. Sabaté, Marcela & Fillat, Carmen & Escario, Regina, 2019. "Budget deficits and money creation: Exploring their relation before Bretton Woods," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 38-56.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cornand, Camille & Gandré, Pauline & Gimet, Céline, 2016. "Increase in home bias in the Eurozone debt crisis: The role of domestic shocks," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 445-469.
    2. Sebastian Blesse & Pierre C Boyer & Friedrich Heinemann & Eckhard Janeba & Anasuya Raj, 2019. "European Monetary Union reform preferences of French and German parliamentarians," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(3), pages 406-424, September.
    3. Giovanni Dosi & Marcello Minenna & Andrea Roventini & Roberto Violi, 2021. "Making the Eurozone work: a risk-sharing reform of the European Stability Mechanism," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 299(1), pages 617-657, April.
    4. Paolo Canofari & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Giovanni Piersanti, 2015. "Strategic Interactions and Contagion Effects under Monetary Unions," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(10), pages 1618-1629, October.
    5. Deborah Mabbett & Waltraud Schelkle, 2014. "Searching under the lamp-post: the evolution of fiscal surveillance," Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series of the London School of Economics (LEQs) 5, London School of Economics / European Institute.
    6. Zongsen Zou & Xiuling Wang & Dengtian Feng, 2020. "Adhere to the rules or be discretionary? Empirical evidence from the euro area," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 15(2), pages 501-525, April.
    7. Eleonora Cutrini & Giorgio Galeazzi, 2017. "External Public Debt, Trade Linkages and Contagion During the Eurozone Crisis," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(9), pages 1718-1749, September.
    8. Salvatore Dell’Erba & Ricardo Hausmann & Ugo Panizza, 2013. "Debt levels, debt composition, and sovereign spreads in emerging and advanced economies," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 29(3), pages 518-547, AUTUMN.
    9. de Grauwe, Paul & Ji, Yuemei & Macchiarelli, Corrado, 2017. "Fundamentals versus market sentiments in the euro bond markets: implications for QE," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 85127, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Pompeo Della Posta & Roberto Tamborini, 2021. "The Existential Trilemma of EMU in a Model of Fiscal Target Zone," EconPol Working Paper 66, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    11. Beqiraj, Elton & Patella, Valeria & Tancioni, Massimiliano, 2021. "Fiscal stance and the sovereign risk pass-through," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    12. Michel Aglietta & Xavier Ragot, 2015. "Érosion du tissu productif en France. Causes et remèdes," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(6), pages 95-150.
    13. Schuster, Florian, 2023. "Sovereign spreads, central bank collateral frameworks, and periphery premia in the Eurozone," Papers 277915, Dezernat Zukunft - Institute for Macrofinance, Berlin.
    14. De Grauwe, Paul & Ji, Yuemei & Steinbach, Armin, 2017. "The EU debt crisis: Testing and revisiting conventional legal doctrine," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 29-37.
    15. Barry Eichengreen & Ugo Panizza, 2016. "A surplus of ambition: can Europe rely on large primary surpluses to solve its debt problem?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 31(85), pages 5-49.
    16. De Grauwe, Paul & Ji, Yuemei, 2016. "Flexibility versus Stability: A difficult trade-off in the eurozone," CEPS Papers 11530, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    17. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5bhbhfsmhj981b00go8c6saind is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Paniagua, Jordi & Sapena, Juan & Tamarit, Cecilio, 2017. "Sovereign debt spreads in EMU: The time-varying role of fundamentals and market distrust," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 187-206.
    19. De Grauwe Paul & Ji Yuemei, 2018. "Core-Periphery Relations in the Eurozone," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-15, December.
    20. Roberto Tamborini, 2012. "Market opinions, fundamentals and the euro-sovereign debt crisis," Department of Economics Working Papers 1210, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    21. Saleem Bahaj, 2014. "Systemic Sovereign Risk: Macroeconomic Implications in the Euro Area," Discussion Papers 1406, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eps:cepswp:13472. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Margarita Minkova (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cepssbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.