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Boards in Agricultural Cooperatives: Competence, Authority, and Incentives

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  • Hendrikse, G.W.J.

Abstract

This article addresses three observations regarding the board of directors in agricultural cooperatives. First, many scholars and practitioners worry about the competency of the member dominated board of directors in agricultural cooperatives. Second, it is sometimes stated that cooperatives seem to behave like ordinary enterprises. Finally, it is argued that cooperatives may have advantages compared to firms with publicly exchanged shares. These observations are analyzed from various contract theoretic perspectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Hendrikse, G.W.J., 2005. "Boards in Agricultural Cooperatives: Competence, Authority, and Incentives," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2005-042-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    • Handle: RePEc:ems:eureri:6883
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    Cited by:

    1. Liang, Q.X. & Hendrikse, G.W.J. & Huang, Z. & Xu, X., 2012. "Core and Common Members in Chinese Farmer Cooperatives," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2012-002-STR, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    2. George APOSTOLAKIS & Gert VAN DIJK, 2018. "Cooperative organizations and members’ role: A new perspective," CIRIEC Working Papers 1804, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    boards; contract theory; cooperatives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness

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