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Organizational Change and Vested Interests

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  • Hendrikse, G.W.J.

Abstract

The nature of organizational change and the value of headquarters is analyzed in a dynamic bargaining model. Organizational change can be either imposed, or voluntary and immediate, or voluntary and delayed. Headquarters derives it value from preventing surplus reducing endogenous commitments.

Suggested Citation

  • Hendrikse, G.W.J., 2000. "Organizational Change and Vested Interests," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2000-17-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
  • Handle: RePEc:ems:eureri:30
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    File URL: https://repub.eur.nl/pub/30/erimrs20000622125336.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 43-58, January.
    3. Boot, Arnoud W A, 1992. "Why Hang on to Losers? Divestitures and Takeovers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1401-1423, September.
    4. Meyer, Margaret & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1992. "Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 9-35, Spring.
    5. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    6. Dewatripont, M & Roland, G, 1992. "The Virtues of Gradualism and Legitimacy in the Transition to a Market Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 291-300, March.
    7. Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1990. "Herd Behavior and Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 465-479, June.
    8. Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
    9. Peter C. Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 205-225.
    10. Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, 1998. "Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 95-114, Fall.
    11. Scott Schaefer, 1998. "Influence Costs, Structural Inertia, and Organizational Change," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 237-263, June.
    12. Stahl, Dale II, 1990. "Bargaining with durable offers and endogenous timing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 173-187, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dynamic bargaining game; headquarters; organizational change;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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