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Multi-Stage Voting and Sequential Elimination with Productive Players

Author

Listed:
  • Matias Nunez

    (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA)

  • Gabriel Desranges

    (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA)

  • Mathieu Martin

    (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA)

Abstract

This paper analyzes a sequential voting mechanism that eliminates at each round one candidate, until only one of them is left (the winner). The candidates are the voters and they only differ across their skill level. The payoff allocated to the winner depends on the sequence of elimination of the players’ skills, the rest of the players receiving a payoff of zero. We fully characterize the equilibria of the game with two skills. The winner must be a high-skilled player if there is an initial majority of strong types. On the contrary, a high-skilled player might win with an initial majority of weak players independently of the size of the majority. For an arbitrary number of types, if some type of candidates form a strict majority at the first stage, the winner belongs either to the majoritarian type or to a more skilled one.

Suggested Citation

  • Matias Nunez & Gabriel Desranges & Mathieu Martin, 2014. "Multi-Stage Voting and Sequential Elimination with Productive Players," THEMA Working Papers 2014-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2014-07
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    File URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2014-07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. McKelvey, Richard D. & Niemi, Richard G., 1978. "A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-22, June.
    5. Fevrier, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2006. "Equilibrium selection: Payoff or risk dominance?: The case of the "weakest link"," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 164-181, June.
    6. Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    strategic voting; backward induction; dynamic voting.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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