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Hölder Continuous Implementation

Author

Listed:
  • Oury Marion

    (Universite de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA, F-95000 Cergy-Pontoise.)

Abstract

Building upon the classical concept of Holder continuity and the notion of "continuous implementation"introduced in Oury and Tercieux (2009), we define Hölder continuous implementation. We show that, under a richness assumption on the payo pro les (associated with outcomes), the following full characterization result holds for finite mechanisms: a social choice function is Hölder continuously implementable if and only if it is fully implementable in rationalizable messages.

Suggested Citation

  • Oury Marion, 2010. "Hölder Continuous Implementation," THEMA Working Papers 2010-06, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2010-06
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    File URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2010-06.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
    4. Marion Oury & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Continuous Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1605-1637, July.
    5. Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 2014. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 2, pages 31-41, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    High order beliefs; Robust implementation;

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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