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Pro Bono Publico? Demand for military spending between the World Wars

Author

Listed:
  • Jari Eloranta

    (Appalachian State University)

Abstract

"This paper aims to analyze the aggregate and individual countries’ demand for military spending during the 1920s and 1930s, based on variables arising from the international system and the countries themselves. The main premise is that the military spending was an impure public good, implying that both public and private benefits drove the demand for this type of expenditure. Threats arising from the increased autocracy in the 1930s increased these expenditures, and democracies on the whole tended to spend less. Moreover, the absence of clear international leadership by the economic giants of the period, like US or UK, destabilized the international system and increased military spending. Military spending resulted in joint products at the level of state and within state, and the level of economic development seemed to exert a downward pressure on the military spending of these states. Rising prices of “defense” in general decreased their relative military spending. There were quite contradictory spillover effects felt by these states."

Suggested Citation

  • Jari Eloranta, 2015. "Pro Bono Publico? Demand for military spending between the World Wars," Working Papers 15016, Economic History Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehs:wpaper:15016
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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