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The Role of the Merchant Coalition in Premodern Japanese Economic Development: An Historical Institutional Analysis

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  • Tetsuji Okazaki

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the role of the merchant coalition (kabu nakama) in Japan in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, from the standpoint of Historical Institutional Analysis (Greif[1997]). The quantitative economic history literature has made clear that sustainable economic growth based on a market economy started in Japan at the end of the eighteenth century. On the other hand, from time to time the central government (Bakufu) legislated ordinances prescribing that suits on pecuniary matters would not be accepted (Aitai Sumeshi Rei). The implication is that the public system for third-party contract enforcement was not working well. The activities of merchant coalitions substituted for public third-party enforcement in premodern Japan. Many of the merchant coalitions' codes prescribed that all of each coalition's members should suspend transaction with those who cheated any one of the members of the coalition. This was the multiple punishment strategy (MPS), as formulated by Greif[1993]. The MPS of the merchant coalition reduced incentives for the players in the market to cheat, which in turn promoted development of a market economy. It is remarkable that the Japanese merchant coalition applied the MPS not only to ordinary commodity trade, but also to the putting-out system and employment. We empirically tested the above hypothesis about the function of the coalition. In 1841, the Bakufu prohibited the coalition, intending to eliminate any monopoly. This event can be regarded as a natural experiment, suitable for an investigation into the role of the coalition. The above hypothesis implies that prohibition of the coalition lowered the performance of the market economy. This implication was examined using data on the money supply and commodity prices. As predicted by the hypothesis, we found that the growth rate of the real money supply contracted and that the efficiency of price arbitrage declined.

Suggested Citation

  • Tetsuji Okazaki, 2001. "The Role of the Merchant Coalition in Premodern Japanese Economic Development: An Historical Institutional Analysis," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-116, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2001cf116
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    Cited by:

    1. Aidin Hajikhameneh & Jared Rubin, 2019. "Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(1), pages 192-237.
    2. Tomihiro Machikita & Tetsuji Okazaki, 2019. "Transition to a Modern Regime and Change in PlantLifecycles: A Natural Experiment from Meiji Japan," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1122, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    3. Masaki Nakabayashi & Tetsuji Okazaki, 2007. "The Role of the Courts in Economic Development: The Case of Prewar Japan," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-517, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    4. Sahle, Esther, 2014. "Quakers, coercion and pre-modern growth: why friends’ formal institutions for contract enforcement did not matter for early Atlantic trade expansion," Economic History Working Papers 60452, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    5. Bassino, Jean-Pascal & van der Eng, Pierre, 2019. "Japan and the Asian Divergence: Market Integration, Climate Anomalies and Famines during the 18th and 19th Centuries," CEI Working Paper Series 2018-18, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    6. Tomohiro Machikita & Tetsuji Okazaki, 2019. "Transition to a Modern Regime and Change in Plant Lifecycles: A Natural Experiment from Meiji Japan," CIGS Working Paper Series 19-006E, The Canon Institute for Global Studies.
    7. Hajikhameneh, Aidin, 2024. "Reputation or court: Individualism, collectivism, and the choice of enforcement mechanism in exchange," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 184-206.
    8. Yamamura, Eiji, 2008. "The role of social capital in homogeneous society: Review of recent researches in Japan," MPRA Paper 11385, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Ferrali, Romain, 2012. "The Maghribi industrialists: contract enforcement in the Moroccan industry, 1956-82," Economic History Working Papers 45680, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    10. Yamamura Eiji, 2008. "The Market for Lawyers and Social Capital: Are Informal Rules a Substitute for Formal Ones?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 499-517, December.

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