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Working or shirking? A closer look at MPs’ expenses and parliamentary attendance

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  • Besley, Timothy
  • Larcinese, Valentino

Abstract

This paper studies determinants of MPs expense claims in Parliament using the data released under the freedom of information act in 2004. Using a multiple regression framework, we correlate expenses with three sets of variables: constituency characteristics, party affiliation and individual characteristics. We also look at the ratio of parliamentary expenses claimed to votes cast in parliament as a crude measure of value for money. We use the results to reflect on two views of the motivation of MPs, the public Choice view and the public service view.

Suggested Citation

  • Besley, Timothy & Larcinese, Valentino, 2005. "Working or shirking? A closer look at MPs’ expenses and parliamentary attendance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3609, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:3609
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Parker, Glenn R & Powers, Stephen C, 2002. "Searching for Symptoms of Political Shirking: Congressional Foreign Travel," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(1-2), pages 173-191, January.
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    3. Solt, Frederick, 2004. "Civics or Structure? Revisiting the Origins of Democratic Quality in the Italian Regions," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(1), pages 123-135, January.
    4. Cain, Bruce E. & Ferejohn, John A. & Fiorina, Morris P., 1984. "The Constituency Service Basis of the Personal Vote for U.S. Representatives and British Members of Parliament," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 110-125, March.
    5. John Lott & W. Reed, 1989. "Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 75-96, April.
    6. Lott, John R, Jr & Bronars, Stephen G, 1993. "Time Series Evidence on Shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(1-2), pages 125-149, June.
    7. John Lott, 1987. "Political cheating," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 169-186, January.
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    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook

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