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The Textile, Apparel, and Footwear Act of 1990: Determinants of Congressional Voting

Author

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  • Stuart D. Allen

    (University of North Carolina at Greensboro)

  • Amelia S. Hopkins

    (North Carolina Trust Company)

Abstract

This article uses probit analysis to examine the effect of political and economic variables on the probability of senators and representatives voting favorably on the Textile, Apparel, and Footwear Trade Act of 1990. The results show that voting behavior by senators and representatives was significantly influenced by their party affiliations, the importance of textile and apparel employment in their states, and campaign contributions. Senate voting behavior also was significantly affected by the length of tenure in office. House voting behavior also was negative and signifi cantly affected by the percentages of states' agricultural employment, which is an important export sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Stuart D. Allen & Amelia S. Hopkins, 1997. "The Textile, Apparel, and Footwear Act of 1990: Determinants of Congressional Voting," Public Finance Review, , vol. 25(5), pages 542-552, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:25:y:1997:i:5:p:542-552
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219702500506
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gerald Keim & Asghar Zardkoohi, 1988. "Looking for leverage in PAC markets: Corporate and labor contributions considered," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 21-34, July.
    2. McArthur, John & Marks, Stephen V, 1988. "Constitutent Interest vs. Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political Opportunity Cost," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(3), pages 461-470, July.
    3. Nollen, Stanley D & Iglarsh, Harvey J, 1990. "Explanations of Protectionism in International Trade Votes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 137-153, August.
    4. Coughlin, Cletus C, 1985. "Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(3), pages 437-448, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter A. Zaleski & Penny Maier Donati, 2000. "Tort Reform Voting in the U.S. Senate," Public Finance Review, , vol. 28(5), pages 415-427, September.

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