Risk taking and performance in multistage tournaments: evidence from weightlifting competitions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Paul Oyer, 1998. "Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(1), pages 149-185.
- Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
- Axel Anderson & Luís M. B. Cabral, 2007.
"Go for broke or play it safe? Dynamic competition with choice of variance,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 593-609, September.
- Cabral, Luis & Anderson, Axel, 2004. "Go For Broke or Play it Safe? Dynamic Competition with Choice of Variance," CEPR Discussion Papers 4249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Christian Grund & Oliver Gurtler, 2005.
"An empirical study on risk-taking in tournaments,"
Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(8), pages 457-461.
- Grund, Christian & Gürtler, Oliver, 2005. "An Empirical Study on Risk Taking in Tournaments," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 6/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Pascal Courty & Gerald Marschke, 2004.
"An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives,"
Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 23-56, January.
- Gerald Marschke & Pascal Courty, 2002. "An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives," Discussion Papers 02-06, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
- Courty, Pascal & Marschke, Gerald, 2002. "An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3164, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997.
"Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
- Judith A. Chevalier & Glenn D. Ellison, 1995. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," NBER Working Papers 5234, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chevalier, J. & Ellison, G., 1996. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Working papers 96-3, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2007.
"Incentives for Managers and Inequality among Workers: Evidence from a Firm-Level Experiment,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(2), pages 729-773.
- Orana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2006. "Incentives for managers and inequality among workers: Evidence from a firm level experiment," Natural Field Experiments 00213, The Field Experiments Website.
- Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2006. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 2062, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2006. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 5649, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dohmen, Thomas J., 2008.
"Do professionals choke under pressure?,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 636-653, March.
- Dohmen, Thomas, 2005. "Do Professionals Choke Under Pressure?," IZA Discussion Papers 1905, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Thomas J. Dohmen, 2010. "Do Professionals Choke Under Pressure?," Working Papers id:2742, eSocialSciences.
- Knoeber, Charles R & Thurman, Walter N, 1994. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 155-179, April.
- Luís M. B. Cabral, 2003. "R&D Competition when firms Choose Variance," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 139-150, March.
- Paserman, M. Daniele, 2023.
"Gender Differences in Performance in Competitive Environments? Evidence from Professional Tennis Players,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 590-609.
- Paserman, Daniele, 2007. "Gender Differences in Performance in Competitive Environments: Evidence from Professional Tennis Players," CEPR Discussion Papers 6335, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paserman, M. Daniele, 2007. "Gender Differences in Performance in Competitive Environments: Evidence from Professional Tennis Players," IZA Discussion Papers 2834, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- M. Daniele Paserman, 2010. "Gender Differences in Performance in Competitive Environments? Evidence from Professional Tennis Players," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-047, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Main, Brian G M & O'Reilly, Charles A, III & Wade, James, 1993. "Top Executive Pay: Tournament or Teamwork?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(4), pages 606-628, October.
- Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2004.
"Gender and Competition at a Young Age,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 377-381, May.
- Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2004. "Gender and competition at a young age," Framed Field Experiments 00151, The Field Experiments Website.
- Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2001. "Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
- Nieken, Petra & Sliwka, Dirk, 2010.
"Risk-taking tournaments - Theory and experimental evidence,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 254-268, June.
- Nieken, Petra & Sliwka, Dirk, 2008. "Risk-Taking Tournaments: Theory and Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3400, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Goriaev, A.P. & Palomino, F.A. & Prat, A., 2000.
"Mutual Fund Tournament : Risk Taking Incentives Induced by Ranking Objectives,"
Discussion Paper
2000-94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Palomino, Frédéric & Prat, Andrea & Goriaev, Alexei P., 2001. "Mutual Fund Tournament: Risk Taking Incentives Induced By Ranking Objectives," CEPR Discussion Papers 2794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Goriaev, A.P. & Palomino, F.A. & Prat, A., 2000. "Mutual Fund Tournament : Risk Taking Incentives Induced by Ranking Objectives," Other publications TiSEM 41aeada1-3d53-4828-bfae-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2000. "Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 245, CESifo.
- Andrews,Donald W. K. & Stock,James H. (ed.), 2005. "Identification and Inference for Econometric Models," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521844413, November.
- Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 2008.
"Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence,"
Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 113, pages 1061-1073,
Elsevier.
- Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, 2008. "Sex and Risk: Experimental Evidence," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-09, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- John A. List, 2003.
"Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 41-71.
- John List, 2003. "Does market experience eliminate market anomalies?," Natural Field Experiments 00297, The Field Experiments Website.
- Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 569-596, May.
- Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Bognanno, Michael L, 1990.
"Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1307-1324, December.
- Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Michael L. Bognanno, 1988. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?," NBER Working Papers 2638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Uri Gneezy & Muriel Niederle & Aldo Rustichini, 2003. "Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(3), pages 1049-1074.
- Brown, Keith C & Harlow, W V & Starks, Laura T, 1996. "Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 85-110, March.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Grund, Christian & Höcker, Jan & Zimmermann, Stefan, 2010. "Risk Taking Behavior in Tournaments: Evidence from the NBA," IZA Discussion Papers 4812, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Christos Genakos & Mario Pagliero, 2012.
"Interim Rank, Risk Taking, and Performance in Dynamic Tournaments,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(4), pages 782-813.
- Christos Genakos & Mario Pagliero, 2009. "Interim Rank, Risk Taking and Performance in Dynamic Tournaments," CEP Discussion Papers dp0928, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Christos Genakos & Mario Pagliero, 2011. "Interim Rank, Risk Taking and Performance in Dynamic Tournaments," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 196, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
- Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011.
"Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?,"
Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330,
Elsevier.
- Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter J., 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," IZA Discussion Papers 4941, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Gary Charness & Peter J. Kuhn, 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," NBER Working Papers 15913, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ozbeklik, Serkan & Smith, Janet Kiholm, 2017. "Risk taking in competition: Evidence from match play golf tournaments," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 506-523.
- Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2012.
"Personnel Economics [The Handbook of Organizational Economics],"
Introductory Chapters,,
Princeton University Press.
- Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2007. "Personnel Economics," NBER Working Papers 13480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward P. Lazear, 1995.
"Personnel Economics,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, December.
- Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2007. "Personnel Economics," NBER Working Papers 13480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mueller-Langer Frank & Andreoli-Versbach Patrick, 2017.
"Leading-Effect, Risk-Taking and Sabotage in Two-Stage Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,"
Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 237(1), pages 1-28, February.
- Müller-Langer, Frank & Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick, 2017. "Leading-Effect, Risk-Taking and Sabotage in Two-Stage Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Munich Reprints in Economics 55040, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Mueller-Langer, Frank & Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick, 2013. "Leading-effect vs. Risk-taking in Dynamic Tournaments: Evidence from a Real-life Randomized Experiment," Discussion Papers in Economics 15452, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Anat Bracha & Chaim Fershtman, 2013.
"Competitive Incentives: Working Harder or Working Smarter?,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 771-781, April.
- Anat Bracha & Chaim Fershtman, 2012. "Competitive incentives: working harder or working smarter?," Working Papers 12-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Frédéric Loss & Antoine Renucci, 2020. "Making Partner," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(4), pages 1510-1534, October.
- Adams, Nathan R. & Waddell, Glen R., 2018. "Performance and risk taking under threat of elimination," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 41-54.
- Adams, Nathan R. & Waddell, Glen R., 2017. "Performance and Risk Taking under Threat of Elimination," IZA Discussion Papers 10977, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Vandegrift, Donald & Yavas, Abdullah, 2009. "Men, women, and competition: An experimental test of behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 554-570, October.
- Donald Vandegrift & Abdullah Yavas & Paul Brown, 2007. "Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(4), pages 345-368, December.
- Basak, Suleyman & Makarov, Dmitry, 2012.
"Difference in interim performance and risk taking with short-sale constraints,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 377-392.
- Basak, Suleyman & Makarov, Dmitry, 2010. "Difference in Interim Performance and Risk Taking with Short-Sale Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 8072, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Suleyman Basak & Dmitry Makarov, 2010. "Difference in Interim Performance and Risk Taking with Short-sale Constraints," Working Papers w0159, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Suleyman Basak & Dmitry Makarov, 2010. "Difference in Interim Performance and Risk Taking with Short-sale Constraints," Working Papers w0159, New Economic School (NES).
- Dickinson, David & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2008.
"Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 56-76, May.
- David Dickinson & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theorie," Post-Print halshs-00180112, HAL.
- Dickinson, David L. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," IZA Discussion Papers 1222, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Marie-Claire Villeval & David Dickinson, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Working Papers 0409, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- David Dickinson & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementary between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Post-Print halshs-00176789, HAL.
- David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2005. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Working Papers 05-12, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
- David Dickinson & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Post-Print halshs-00175010, HAL.
- Eriksen, Kristoffer W. & Kvaløy, Ola, 2014.
"Myopic risk-taking in tournaments,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 37-46.
- Eriksen, Kristoffer & Kvaløy, Ola, 2012. "Myopic Risk Taking in Tournaments," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2012/13, University of Stavanger.
- Böheim, René & Lackner, Mario, 2013.
"Gender and Competition: Evidence from Jumping Competitions,"
IZA Discussion Papers
7243, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- René Böheim & Mario Lackner, 2013. "Gender and Competition: Evidence from Jumping Competitions," Economics working papers 2013-05, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Klein Teeselink, Bouke & Potter van Loon, Rogier J.D. & van den Assem, Martijn J. & van Dolder, Dennie, 2020.
"Incentives, performance and choking in darts,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 38-52.
- Bouke Klein Teeselink & Rogier J. D. Potter van Loon & Martijn (M.J.) van den Assem & Dennie van Dolder, 2018. "Incentives, Performance and Choking in Darts," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-101/IV, Tinbergen Institute, revised 30 Sep 2019.
- Tor Eriksson & Sabrina Teyssier & Marie‐Claire Villeval, 2009.
"Self‐Selection And The Efficiency Of Tournaments,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(3), pages 530-548, July.
- Tor Eriksson & Sabrina Teyssier & Marie Claire Villeval, 2006. "Self-selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments," Post-Print halshs-00175469, HAL.
- Tor Eriksson & Sabrina Teyssier & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments," Working Papers 0603, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Tor Eriksson & Sabrina Teyssier & Marie Claire Villeval, 2009. "Self-selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments," Post-Print halshs-00451600, HAL.
- Eriksson, Tor & Teyssier, Sabrina & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2006. "Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments," IZA Discussion Papers 1983, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Tor Eriksson & Sabrina Teyssier & Marie Claire Villeval, 2006. "Self-selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments," Post-Print halshs-00175480, HAL.
- Tor Eriksson & Sabrina Teyssier & Marie Claire Villeval, 2006. "Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments," Post-Print halshs-00175041, HAL.
- Debapriya Jojo Paul & Julia Henker & Sian Owen, 2019. "The aggregate impacts of tournament incentives in experimental asset markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 441-476, June.
More about this item
Keywords
Choking under pressure; incentives; performance; risk taking; tournaments;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:28599. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.