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The value and limits of unemployment insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Kolsrud, Jonas
  • Spinnewijn, Johannes

Abstract

This paper reviews some recent findings regarding unemployment and unemployment insurance in particular, drawing on comprehensive administrative data from Sweden. Firstly, it explores the value of unemployment insurance, revealing that individuals value UI more than previously thought. Secondly, it examines the nature of unemployment, demonstrating that long-term unemployment is predictable and challenging preconceived notions on how unemployment can be a trap. Lastly, it explores the possibility of providing choice in unemployment insurance, finding limited adverse selection. Based on these pieces of evidence, we draw implications for the expansion of UI coverage for non-standard workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Kolsrud, Jonas & Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2024. "The value and limits of unemployment insurance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 122225, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:122225
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/122225/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 370-399, April.
    2. Arthur Seibold & Sebastian Seitz & Sebastian Siegloch, 2022. "Privatizing Disability Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series 9979, CESifo.
    3. Kyyrä, Tomi & Parrotta, Pierpaolo & Rosholm, Michael, 2013. "The effect of receiving supplementary UI benefits on unemployment duration," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 122-133.
    4. Stefan Eriksson & Dan-Olof Rooth, 2014. "Do Employers Use Unemployment as a Sorting Criterion When Hiring? Evidence from a Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(3), pages 1014-1039, March.
    5. Raj Chetty, 2009. "Sufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural and Reduced-Form Methods," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 451-488, May.
    6. Handel, Benjamin & Kolstad, Jonathan & Minten, Thomas Joris & Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2020. "The social determinants of choice quality: evidence from health insurance in the Netherlands," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 108468, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Jonas Kolsrud & Camille Landais & Peter Nilsson & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2018. "The Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits: Theory and Evidence from Sweden," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(4-5), pages 985-1033, April.
    8. McCall, Brian P, 1996. "Unemployment Insurance Rules, Joblessness, and Part-Time Work," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 647-682, May.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    non-standard employment; unemployment; social insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R14 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Land Use Patterns
    • J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General

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