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Reviving and revising economic liberalism: an examination in relation to private decisions and public policy

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  • Oliver, Adam

Abstract

The principal objective of the liberal economic tradition is to encourage mutually advantageous actions between individuals, and the best means by which to do this, according to those who follow this tradition, is a demand-led competitive market. This article summaries the propositions of the liberal economic tradition and concludes that while its components ought to be tolerated over private decision-making in order to protect individual autonomy, the demand-led competitive market provides incentives for egoistic actions that may harm groups, and by extension, the individuals within those groups. As such, it is argued that it is not sensible to introduce or maintain a demand-led competitive market in public sector services because it may undermine the pursuit of broadly agreed-upon collective goals in these sectors. The article finishes with a discussion of some alternative public sector policy mechanisms that may better serve the aim of crowding in cooperative actions and behaviours.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver, Adam, 2020. "Reviving and revising economic liberalism: an examination in relation to private decisions and public policy," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 103060, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:103060
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103060/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    competition; cooperation; egoism; governance; liberalism; reciprocity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics

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