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Building consensus: Shifting strategies in the territorial targeting of Turkey's public transport investment

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  • Davide Luca
  • Andrés Rodríguez-Pose

Abstract

A growing amount of research explores how the allocation of regional development monies follows electoral reasons. Yet, the existing literature on distributive politics provides different and contrasting expectations on which geographical areas will be targeted. We focus on proportional representation (PR) systems. While in such settings governments have incentives to target core districts and punish foes', we suggest that when incumbents attempt to build a state-party image they may broaden the territorial allocation of benefits and even target opposition out-groups. We exploit data on Turkey's public transport investment for the period 2003-2014 and in-depth interviews to provide results in support of our hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Davide Luca & Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, 2019. "Building consensus: Shifting strategies in the territorial targeting of Turkey's public transport investment," Papers in Evolutionary Economic Geography (PEEG) 1910, Utrecht University, Department of Human Geography and Spatial Planning, Group Economic Geography, revised Apr 2019.
    • Handle: RePEc:egu:wpaper:1910
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Yannis Psycharis & Vassilis Tselios, 2016. "Politics and Investment: Examining the Territorial Allocation of Public Investment in Greece," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(7), pages 1097-1112, July.
    6. Matthew Lambrinidis & Yannis Psycharis & Antonis Rovolis, 2005. "Regional allocation of public infrastructure investment: The case of Greece," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(9), pages 1231-1244.
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    Cited by:

    1. Burhan Can Karahasan & Fırat Bilgel, 2021. "The Topography and Sources of Multidimensional Poverty in Turkey," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 413-445, April.
    2. Luca, Davide, 2022. "National elections, sub-national growth: the politics of Turkey's provincial economic dynamics under AKP rule," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112682, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Lisa Ahsen Sezer & Gül Berna Özcan, 2024. "Local champions and change of governments: a longitudinal analysis of firms’ political ties in Gaziantep, Turkey," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(2), pages 263-283.
    4. Pinar Deniz & Burhan Can Karahasan & Mehmet Pinar, 2021. "Determinants of regional distribution of AKP votes: Analysis of post‐2002 parliamentary elections," Regional Science Policy & Practice, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 323-352, April.
    5. repec:ehl:lserod:115939 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Davide Luca, 2022. "National elections, sub-national growth: the politics of Turkey’s provincial economic dynamics under AKP rule [Shift-share designs: theory and inference]," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(4), pages 829-851.
    7. Timini, Jacopo, 2020. "Staying dry on Spanish wine: The rejection of the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public investment; transport infrastructure; distributive politics; politics of development; Turkey;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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