Sources of economic renewal: from the traditional firm to the knowledge firm
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: 54288
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Lawrence F. Katz & Kevin M. Murphy, 1992.
"Changes in Relative Wages, 1963–1987: Supply and Demand Factors,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(1), pages 35-78.
- Lawrence F. Katz & Kevin M. Murphy, 1991. "Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors," NBER Working Papers 3927, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Katz, L.F. & Murphy, K.M., 1991. "Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1580, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1994. "Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 190-209, March.
- Kremer, M & Maskin, E, 1996.
"Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill,"
Working papers
96-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Michael Kremer & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill," NBER Working Papers 5718, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997.
"Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
- Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Normal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 94-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," IDEI Working Papers 37, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Scholarly Articles 4554125, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Joshua Gans & Scott Stern, 2003.
"When does funding research by smaller firms bear fruit?: Evidence from the SBIR program,"
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(4), pages 361-384.
- Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, 2000. "When Does Funding Research by Smaller Firms Bear Fruit?: Evidence from the SBIR Program," NBER Working Papers 7877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001.
"The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(3), pages 805-851.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms," NBER Working Papers 7546, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999.
"Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 6726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1998. "Foundations of incomplete contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19354, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1846, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Robert J. Gordon, 2000.
"Does the "New Economy" Measure Up to the Great Inventions of the Past?,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 49-74, Fall.
- Gordon, Robert J., 2000. "Does the 'New Economy' Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2607, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Robert J. Gordon, 2000. "Does the "New Economy" Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past?," NBER Working Papers 7833, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa & Eve Caroli & Philippe Aghion, 1999.
"Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1615-1660, December.
- Aghion, Philippe & Caroli, Eve & Garcia-Penalosa, Cecilia, 1999. "Inequality and economic growth: the perspective of the new growth theories," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9908, CEPREMAP.
- Aghion, Philippe & Caroli, Eve & GarcÃa-Peñalosa, Cecilia, 1999. "Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories," Scholarly Articles 12502063, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000.
"Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not),"
NBER Working Papers
7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wesley M Cohen & Richard R Nelson & John P Walsh, 2003. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not)," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000624, David K. Levine.
- Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
- repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
- Joshua S. Gans & David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, 2002.
"When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction?,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 571-586, Winter.
- Joshua S. Gans & David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, 2000. "When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction?," NBER Working Papers 7851, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Per Krusell & Lee E. Ohanian & JosÈ-Victor RÌos-Rull & Giovanni L. Violante, 2000.
"Capital-Skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1029-1054, September.
- Per Krusell & Lee E. Ohanian & José-Víctor Ríos-Rull & Giovanni L. Violante, 1997. "Capital-skill complementarity and inequality: a macroeconomic analysis," Staff Report 239, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
- Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, 1998. "The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 73-94, Fall.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/10091 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kenneth J. Arrow, 1975. "Vertical Integration and Communication," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(1), pages 173-183, Spring.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1995. "Some implications of growth for organizational form and ownership structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 440-455, April.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006.
"Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2008.
"Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization,"
Economics Working Papers
1254, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 2014.
- Giacomo Ponzetto, 2014. "Intellectual Property Rights and Efficient Firm Organization," Working Papers 668, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Ponzetto, Giacomo, 2012. "Intellectual Property Rights and Efficient Firm Organization," CEPR Discussion Papers 9212, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Garrouste, Pierre & Saussier, Stephane, 2005.
"Looking for a theory of the firm: Future challenges,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 178-199, October.
- Pierre Garrouste & Stéphane Saussier, 2005. "Looking for a theory of the firm: future challenges," Post-Print halshs-00274280, HAL.
- Pierre Garrouste & Stéphane Saussier, 2005. "Looking for a theory of the firm: future challenges," Post-Print halshs-01300351, HAL.
- Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
- Xiaokai Yang, 2000.
"Incomplete Contingent Labor Contract, Asymmetric Residual Rights and Authority, and the Theory of the Firm,"
CID Working Papers
45, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
- Xiaokai Yang, 2000. "Incomplete Contingent Labor Contract, Asymmetric Residual Rights and Authority, and the Theory of the Firm," CID Working Papers 45A, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
- Bickenbach, Frank, 2000. "Regulation of Europe's network industries: the perspective of the new economic theory of federalism," Kiel Working Papers 977, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2020. "On efficient firm formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-12.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023.
"The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 18208, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," MPRA Paper 117742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Philippe Aghion & Ufuk Akcigit & Antonin Bergeaud & Richard Blundell & David Hemous, 2019.
"Innovation and Top Income Inequality,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 1-45.
- Blundell, Richard & Aghion, Philippe & Hémous, David & Akcigit, Ufuk & Bergeaud, Antonin, 2015. "Innovation and Top Income Inequality," CEPR Discussion Papers 10659, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Aghion, Philippe & Akcigit, Ufuk & Bergeaud, Antonin & Blundell, Richard & Hemous, David, 2019. "Innovation and top income inequality," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100356, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Philippe Aghion & Ufuk Akcigit & Antonin Bergeaud & Richard Blundell & David Hémous, 2015. "Innovation and Top Income Inequality," NBER Working Papers 21247, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ufuk Akcigit & Richard Blundell & David Hemous & Antonin Bergeaud & Philippe Aghion, 2015. "Innovation and Top Income Inequality," 2015 Meeting Papers 1115, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- P. Aghion & U. Akcigit & A. Bergeaud & R. Blundell & D. Hémous, 2015. "Innovation and Top Income Inequality," Working papers 557, Banque de France.
- Philippe Aghion & Ufuk Akcigit & Antonin Bergeaud & Richard Blundell & David Hémous, 2019. "Innovation and Top Income Inequality," Post-Print halshs-01883570, HAL.
- Philippe Aghion & Ufuk Akcigit & Antonin Bergeaud & Richard Blundell & David Hémous, 2019. "Innovation and Top Income Inequality," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01883570, HAL.
- Bernard Baudry & Virgile Chassagnon, 2012.
"The vertical network organization as a specific governance structure: what are the challenges for incomplete contracts theories and what are the theoretical implications for the boundaries of the (hub,"
Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(2), pages 285-303, May.
- Bernard Baudry & Virgile Chassagnon, 2012. "The vertical network organization as a specific governance structure : what are the challenges for incomplete contracts theories and what are the theoretical implications for the boundaries of the (hu," Post-Print halshs-00683231, HAL.
- Bernard Baudry & Bruno Tinel, 2003. "Une analyse théorique des fondements et du fonctionnement de la relation d'autorité intrafirme," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00270902, HAL.
- Liliana Basile & Raffaele Trani, 2008. "Incomplete Contracts Modelling," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 347-370, July.
- Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008.
"Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead,"
Working Papers ECARES
2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2009. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/43903, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Huo, Jingjing, 2015. "How Nations Innovate: The Political Economy of Technological Innovation in Affluent Capitalist Economies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198735847.
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001.
"The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory,"
Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Makoto Hanazono, 2004.
"Holdup with Subsidized Investment,"
Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings
640, Econometric Society.
- Makoto Hanazono, 2004. "Holdup with Subsidized Investment," KIER Working Papers 586, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015.
"Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 23-31.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bernard Baudry & Bruno Tinel, 2003. "Une analyse théorique des fondements et du fonctionnement de la relation d'autorité intrafirme," Post-Print halshs-00270902, HAL.
- Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, 1999. "Understanding Ownership Residual Rights of Control and Appropriable Control Rights," DRUID Working Papers 99-4, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
More about this item
Keywords
economic renewal; knowledge firm; traditional firm;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:200143. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Official Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/emieude.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.