IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ebg/heccah/0943.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

La théorie de la décision et la psychologie du sens commun

Author

Listed:
  • Mongin, Philippe

    (HEC Paris)

Abstract

Author's abstract. L'article compare philosophiquement la théorie mathématique de la décision individuelle, d'une part, et la conception psychologique ordinaire de l'action, du désir et de la croyance, d'autre part.Il délimite plus strictement son objet en étudiant, sous cet angle comparatif, le système de Savage et son concept technique de probabilité subjective, rapporté,comme chez Ramsey, au modèle élémentaire du pari. L'examen est scandé par trois thèses philosophiques: (i) la théorie de la décision n'est que la psychologie commune mise en langage formel (Lewis), (ii) la première améliore substantiellement la seconde, mais ne s'affranchit pas des limites caractéristiques de celle-ci, en particulier de son inaptitude à séparer empiriquement le désir et la croyance (Davidson), (iii)la première améliore substantiellement la seconde, et par les innovations qu'elle comporte, s'affranchit de certaines de ses limitations. On s'est donné pour but d'établir la thèse (iii)à la fois contre la thèse trop simple(i)et contre la thèse subtile(ii).

Suggested Citation

  • Mongin, Philippe, 2013. "La théorie de la décision et la psychologie du sens commun," HEC Research Papers Series 943, HEC Paris.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0943
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.hec.fr/heccontent/download/4746/114814/version/2/file/CR_943_P._Mongin.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226727233 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Edi Karni & Philippe Mongin, 2000. "On the Determination of Subjective Probability by Choices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 233-248, February.
    3. Machina, Mark J & Schmeidler, David, 1992. "A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 745-780, July.
    4. Cohen, M. & Tallon, J.M., 1999. "Decision dans le risque et l'incertitude:l'apport des modeles non additifs," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 1999.69, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    5. Philippe Mongin, 2003. "L'axiomatisation et les théories économiques," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 54(1), pages 99-138.
    6. Gilboa,Itzhak, 2009. "Theory of Decision under Uncertainty," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521741231, November.
    7. Guala,Francesco, 2005. "The Methodology of Experimental Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521618618, January.
    8. Philippe Mongin, 2002. "Le principe de rationalité et l'unité des sciences sociales," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 53(2), pages 301-323.
    9. Karni, Edi, 1996. "Probabilities and Beliefs," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 249-262, November.
    10. Richard Bradley, 2007. "A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 233-263, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2016. "Mentalism Versus Behaviourism In Economics: A Philosophy-Of-Science Perspective," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 249-281, July.
    2. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-01249632 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Michaël Lainé, 2014. "Vers une alternative au paradigme de la rationalité ? Victoires et déboires du programme spinoziste en économie," Post-Print hal-01335618, HAL.
    4. Gilbert Giacomoni, 2012. "On the Origin of Abstraction : Real and Imaginary Parts of Decidability-Making," Post-Print hal-00750628, HAL.
    5. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01249632 is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Grant, Simon & Karni, Edi, 2004. "A theory of quantifiable beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 515-546, August.
    2. Klaus Nehring, 2006. "Decision-Making in the Context of Imprecise Probabilistic Beliefs," Economics Working Papers 0034, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    3. Brian Hill, 2009. "Living without state-independence of utilities," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(4), pages 405-432, October.
    4. Giocoli, Nicola, 2011. "From Wald to Savage: homo economicus becomes a Bayesian statistician," MPRA Paper 34117, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Simon Grant & Edi Karni, 2005. "Why Does It Matter That Beliefs And Valuations Be Correctly Represented?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(3), pages 917-934, August.
    6. Fumagalli, Roberto, 2021. "Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112446, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Hill, Brian, 2010. "An additively separable representation in the Savage framework," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 2044-2054, September.
    8. Lo, Kin Chung, 2011. "Possibility and permissibility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 109-113, September.
    9. Karni, Edi, 2007. "Foundations of Bayesian theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 167-188, January.
    10. Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler, 2019. "What are axiomatizations good for?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 339-359, May.
    11. Antony Millner & Raphael Calel & David Stainforth & George MacKerron, 2013. "Do probabilistic expert elicitations capture scientists’ uncertainty about climate change?," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 116(2), pages 427-436, January.
    12. Robert F. Nau, 2003. "A Generalization of Pratt-Arrow Measure to Nonexpected-Utility Preferences and Inseparable Probability and Utility," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(8), pages 1089-1104, August.
    13. Roberto Fumagalli, 2021. "Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 337-356, October.
    14. Federico Echenique & Taisuke Imai & Kota Saito, 2019. "Decision Making under Uncertainty: An Experimental Study in Market Settings," Papers 1911.00946, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    15. Laurent Denant-Boemont & Olivier L’Haridon, 2013. "La rationalité à l'épreuve de l'économie comportementale," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 35-89.
    16. Daniel Serra, 2019. "La neuroéconomie en question : débats et controverses," Working Papers halshs-02160911, HAL.
    17. Baccelli, Jean & Hartmann, Lorenz, 2023. "The Sure-Thing Principle," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    18. Robert Nau, 2001. "De Finetti was Right: Probability Does Not Exist," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 89-124, December.
    19. Thai Ha-Huy, 2019. "Savage's theorem with atoms," Documents de recherche 19-05, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
    20. Chambers, Robert G. & Melkonyan, Tigran, 2017. "Ambiguity, reasoned determination, and climate-change policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 74-92.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    théorie de la décision; savage; ramsey; probabilité subjective; utilité dépendante des états; psychologie du sens commun; désir; croyance; lewis; davidson;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0943. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Antoine Haldemann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/hecpafr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.