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Uniformly Bounded Information and Social Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Donald E. Campbell

    (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)

  • Jerry S. Kelly

    (Department of Economics, Syracuse University)

Abstract

The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and there is a positive number β such that each pair of alternatives can be socially ordered without having to consult individual preference over a set with more than β alternatives then there are arbitrarily large finite subsets of X within which f is dictatorial when individual preferences are restricted to a rich subset of profiles.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2007. "Uniformly Bounded Information and Social Choice," Working Papers 49, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:49
    as

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    File URL: http://economics.wm.edu/wp/cwm_wp49.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2005. "Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 22-44, September.
    2. repec:bla:econom:v:38:y:1971:i:152:p:413-20 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Marc Fleurbaey, 2003. "On the informational basis of social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 347-384, October.
    4. Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2005. "Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 93-127, September.
    5. Osborne, Dale K, 1976. "Irrelevant Alternatives and Social Welfare," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(5), pages 1001-1015, September.
    6. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2000. "Information and preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(1), pages 3-24.
    7. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2002. "Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 35-94, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    chromatic graphs; generalized IIA; social welfare function;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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