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Irrelevant Alternatives and Social Welfare

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  • Osborne, Dale K

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  • Osborne, Dale K, 1976. "Irrelevant Alternatives and Social Welfare," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(5), pages 1001-1015, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:44:y:1976:i:5:p:1001-15
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    Cited by:

    1. Sprumont, Yves, 2018. "Ranking by rating," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    2. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2009. "Uniformly bounded information and social choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(7-8), pages 415-421, July.
    3. Yew‐Kwang Ng, 1981. "Bentham or Nash? On the Acceptable Form of Social Welfare Functions," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 57(3), pages 238-250, September.
    4. Sprumont, Yves, 2018. "Belief-weighted Nash aggregation of Savage preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 222-245.
    5. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2007. "Uniformly Bounded Information and Social Choice," Working Papers 49, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
    6. Grzegorz Pierczy'nski & Stanis{l}aw Szufa, 2024. "Single-Winner Voting with Alliances: Avoiding the Spoiler Effect," Papers 2401.16399, arXiv.org.
    7. Aubin, Jean-Baptiste & Gannaz, Irène & Leoni, Samuela & Rolland, Antoine, 2022. "Deepest voting: A new way of electing," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 1-16.
    8. Eden, Maya, 2020. "Aggregating Welfare Gains," CEPR Discussion Papers 14783, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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