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A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium

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  • Gerald H. Kramer

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  • Gerald H. Kramer, 1975. "A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 396, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:396
    Note: CFP 459.
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    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d03/d0396.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shubik, Martin, 1970. "Voting, or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 179-181, March.
    2. Ordeshook, Peter C., 1971. "Pareto Optimality in Electoral Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(4), pages 1141-1145, December.
    3. Paul B. Simpson, 1969. "On Defining Areas of Voter Choice: Professor Tullock on Stable Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 83(3), pages 478-490.
    4. Joseph Kadane, 1972. "On division of the question," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 47-54, September.
    5. J. Craven, 1971. "Majority Voting and Social Choice," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 265-267.
    6. Davis, Otto A & DeGroot, Morris H & Hinich, Melvin J, 1972. "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-157, January.
    7. Donald J. Brown, 1973. "Acyclic Choice," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 360, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Delgado-Vega, Álvaro, 2024. "Persistence in power of long-lived parties," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    2. Jacques DEFOURNY, 1979. "Des Cycles Économiques Aux Cycles Politiques," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 43-56, October.
    3. Frey, Bruno S., 1978. "Politico-economic models and cycles," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 203-220, April.

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