Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?
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- Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan, 2012. "Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000433, David K. Levine.
- Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan, 2012. "Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items," Discussion Paper Series dp606, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2022-04-11 (Banking)
- NEP-DES-2022-04-11 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2022-04-11 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2022-04-11 (Operations Research)
- NEP-UPT-2022-04-11 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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