Fighting for votes: theory and evidence on the causes of electoral violence

Electoral violence is widespread in developing countries. However, its causes are poorly understood. I present a theoretical model of electoral competition in which electoral violence is more likely to emerge if (1) the electoral bases of leading parties are of similar size, implying that political competition is tight, and (2) polarization between violent supporters of leading parties is high. The relative importance of these two conditions varies with the type of electoral violence (e.g. clashes, intimidation or murders). The predictions of the model are tested and validated using a unique dataset on electoral violence during the 2010 elections in Burundi. I compare the incidence of electoral violence between neighboring municipalities, relying on the fact that neighboring municipalities more likely to have similar unobserved characteristics. In line with the theoretical model, I find that a one-standard-deviation increase in political competition induces a 35 to 66% increase in the predicted number of violent episodes. A one-standard-deviation increase in ex-rebels’ polarization induces a 40 to 50% increase in the predicted number of violent episodes.