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On the Nature of First Democratic Elections

Author

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  • Leonard Wantchekon

    (Department of Political Science and Economic Growth Center, Yale University)

Abstract

This article investigates voting behavior and policy outcomes when violence can occur after the election. The author finds that under complete information, voters will prefer the weak party—that is, the party that is the least capable of controlling violence. Under incomplete information, however, violence might occur, and voters could prefer the party the most capable of controlling violence. Finally, the author shows that despite this likely voting outcome, the weak party will choose to participate nonaggressively in the election, providing legitimacy to the new democratic process.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonard Wantchekon, 1999. "On the Nature of First Democratic Elections," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(2), pages 245-258, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:43:y:1999:i:2:p:245-258
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043002008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1990. "A model of electoral competition with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 309-325, April.
    2. Steven A. Matthews, 1989. "Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 347-369.
    3. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    4. Courtney Jung & Ian Shapiro, 1995. "South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition, and the New Constitutional Order," Politics & Society, , vol. 23(3), pages 269-308, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sarkar, Abhirup & Sinha, Abhinandan, 2022. "Clientelism and violence: The politics of informal economy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    2. Olivier Sterck, 2020. "Fighting for Votes: Theory and Evidence on the Causes of Electoral Violence," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 87(347), pages 844-883, July.
    3. Christian Alozie Ogbonna & Nnanyelugo Okoro & Joseph O. Wogu, 2020. "Influence of Hate Speech on Public Perception of Presidential Candidates’ Credibility During the 2015 Presidential Election in Nigeria," Global Journal of Health Science, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 12(5), pages 1-20, May.
    4. Soumyanetra Munshi, 2019. "Jaw–jaw and war–war: a game-theoretic exploration of violence in electoral politics," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 203-237, December.
    5. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati, 2009. "Does Timing og Elections Instigate Riots? A Subnational Study of 16 Indian States, 1958-2004," Working Papers id:1835, eSocialSciences.
    6. Ashish Chaturvedi, 2005. "Rigging elections with violence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 189-202, July.
    7. Mvukiyehe, Eric & Samii, Cyrus, 2017. "Promoting Democracy in Fragile States: Field Experimental Evidence from Liberia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 254-267.
    8. Stasavage, David, 2003. "Democracy and education spending: has Africa's move to multiparty elections made a difference to policy?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 6645, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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