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A guided tour to (real-life) social network elicitation

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Brañas-Garza

    (GLOBE and Middlesex University London)

  • Ramón Cobo-Reyes

    (GLOBE and Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.)

  • Natalia Jiménez

    (GLOBE and Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.)

  • Giovanni Ponti

    (Universidad de Alicante and Università di Ferrara)

Abstract

Limited attention has been devoted on how (real-life) social networks are elicited and mapped, even less from the viewpoint of mechanism design. This paper surveys the few mechanisms that have been proposed by the experimental literature to this purpose. These mechanisms differ in their incentive structure, as well as in the means of reward they employ. We compare these elicitation devices on the basis of the estimated di erences in the characteristics of the induced networks, such as the number of (mutual) links, correspondence and accuracy. Our main conclusion is that the elicited network architecture is itself dependent on the nature (and the structure) of the incentives. This, in turn, should provide the social scientist with guidelines on the most appropriate device to use, depending on the research objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Brañas-Garza & Ramón Cobo-Reyes & Natalia Jiménez & Giovanni Ponti, 2013. "A guided tour to (real-life) social network elicitation," ThE Papers 13/07, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
  • Handle: RePEc:gra:wpaper:13/07
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    File URL: http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers13_07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social Networks; Experimental Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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