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(In)Transparency of Information Acquisition: A Bargaining Experiment

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  • Gehrig, Thomas
  • Güth, Werner
  • Levínsky, René

Abstract

We analyze how transparency affects information acquisition in a bargaining context, where proposers may chose to purchase information about the unknown outside option of their bargaining partner. Although information acquisition is excessive in all our scenarios we find that the bargaining outcome depends crucially on the transparency of the bargaining environment. In transparent games, when responders can observe whether proposers have acquired information, acceptance rates are higher. Accordingly, in transparent bargaining environments information is more valuable, both individually and socially.

Suggested Citation

  • Gehrig, Thomas & Güth, Werner & Levínsky, René, 2006. "(In)Transparency of Information Acquisition: A Bargaining Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 5817, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5817
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Conrads, Julian & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2013. "Strategic ignorance in ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 104-115.
    2. Conrads, Julian & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2011. "Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 6087, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information acquisition; Ultimatum experiment; transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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