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Monetary Policy and Lexicographic Preference Ordering

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  • Driffill, John
  • Rotondi, Zeno

Abstract

In this Paper we argue that the objectives given to the European Central Bank in the Maastricht Treaty are not well represented by the widely used weighted sum of squared deviations of inflation and output from target (plus possibly terms in squared changes in interest rates to pick up interest rate smoothing). Instead the stated lexicographic ordering should be taken at face value and its implications explored fully. We set out a number of models that do this, and comment on their implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Driffill, John & Rotondi, Zeno, 2004. "Monetary Policy and Lexicographic Preference Ordering," CEPR Discussion Papers 4247, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4247
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, April.
    6. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2001. "Price Stability as a Target for Monetary Policy: Defining and Maintaining Price Stability," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Deutsche Bundesbank (ed.), The Monetary Transmission Process, chapter 2, pages 60-111, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Laubach, T. & Posen, A.S., 1997. "Disciplined Discretion: Monetary Targeting in Germany and Switzerland," Princeton Essays in International Economics 206, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
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    10. Alexius, Annika, 1999. "Inflation rules with consistent escape clauses," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 509-523, March.
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    14. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hartmann, Philipp & Smets, Frank, 2018. "The first twenty years of the European Central Bank: monetary policy," Working Paper Series 2219, European Central Bank.
    2. Zeno Rotondi & Giacomo Vaciago, 2007. "Lessons from the ECB Experience: Frankfurt Still Matters!," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 36(2), pages 147-170, July.
    3. Q. Farooq Akram & Ragnar Nymoen, 2009. "Model Selection for Monetary Policy Analysis: How Important is Empirical Validity?," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 71(1), pages 35-68, February.
    4. Anselm Küsters, 2022. "Applying Lessons from the Past? Exploring Historical Analogies in ECB Speeches through Text Mining, 1997–2019," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 18(1), pages 277-329, March.
    5. Alberto Locarno, 2007. "Imperfect Knowledge, Adaptive Learning, and the Bias Against Activist Monetary Policies," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(3), pages 47-85, September.
    6. George A. Kahn & Lisa Taylor, 2014. "Evolving market perceptions of Federal Reserve policy objectives," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q I, pages 5-64.
    7. Q. Farooq Akram & Ragnar Nymoen, 2006. "Model selection for monetary policy analysis – Importance of empirical validity," Working Paper 2006/13, Norges Bank.
    8. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2009. "From Ordients to Optimization: Substitution Effects without Differentiability," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/6, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary policy; Time inconsistency; Lexicographic preferences; European central bank;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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