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Pension Fund Governance and the Choice Between Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans

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  • Besley, Tim
  • Prat, Andrea

Abstract

Recent events in several countries have underscored the importance of good governance in private occupational pension plans. The present Paper uses contract theory to analyse the interplay of residual claims and control rights in private pensions. The residual claimant is the plan sponsor in a defined benefit (DB) plan and the pool of beneficiaries in a defined contribution (DC) plan. The main control rights we examine relate to decisions on funding, asset allocation, and asset management. Under complete contracting, governance can be shown to be neutral: DC and DB plans differ only on risk allocation. If instead contracts are incomplete, a DB (DC) plan should: (1) Assign more vigilance responsibility to the sponsor (beneficiaries); (2) Rely less (more) on trustees; (3) Tend to employ trustees that are professional experts (caring insiders); (4) Assign asset allocation rights to the sponsor (beneficiaries); (5) have strict funding requirements.

Suggested Citation

  • Besley, Tim & Prat, Andrea, 2003. "Pension Fund Governance and the Choice Between Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans," CEPR Discussion Papers 3955, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3955
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    1. Andrea Prat, 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Anne Lavigne, 2006. "Gouvernance et investissement des fonds de pension privés aux Etats-Unis," Working Papers halshs-00081401, HAL.
    2. Guy Rolnik & Julia Cagé & Joshua Gans & Ellen Goodman & Brian Knight & Andrea Prat & Anya Schiffrin, 2019. "Protecting Journalism in the Age of Digital Platforms," Working Papers hal-03947806, HAL.
    3. Stefan W. Schmitz, 2005. "Die Governance-Struktur der Pensionskassen in Österreich und ihre politökonomischen Konsequenzen," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 31(3), pages 407-443.
    4. Thomas Steinberger, 2005. "Pension benefit default risk and welfare effects of funding regulation," CSEF Working Papers 147, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    5. Siegmann, Arjen, 2011. "Minimum funding ratios for defined-benefit pension funds," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(3), pages 417-434, July.
    6. Luciano Greco, 2005. "The Optimal Design of Funded Pension Plans: Unbundling Financing and Investment," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0003, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    7. Josiah, J. & Gough, O. & Haslam, J. & Shah, N., 2014. "Corporate reporting implication in migrating from defined benefit to defined contribution pension schemes: A focus on the UK," Accounting forum, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 18-37.
    8. Jin Sug Yang & Anna Bedford & Martin Bugeja, 2023. "Director expertise and co‐option in industry superannuation funds?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(S1), pages 1249-1283, April.
    9. Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski, Oskar, 2012. "Crisis, internal governance mechanisms and pension fund performance: Evidence from Poland," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 493-515.
    10. Cocco, Joâo F. & Volpin, Paolo, 2005. "The Corporate Governance of Defined-Benefit Pension Plans: Evidence from the United Kingdom," CEPR Discussion Papers 4932, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Hess, David & Impavido, Gregorio, 2003. "Governance of public pension funds : lessons from corporate governance and international evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3110, The World Bank.
    12. repec:aia:aiaswp:wp99 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Greco, Luciano G., 2006. "The optimal design of funded pensions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24519, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pension fund; Governance; Private pension;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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