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Are better governed funds better monitors?

Author

Listed:
  • Chou, Julia
  • Ng, Lilian
  • Wang, Qinghai

Abstract

Using Morningstar mutual fund stewardship grade data, we find that the governance mechanisms of mutual funds play a key role in their monitoring of portfolio firms and in their investment decisions. Mutual funds with better governance practices tend to vote responsibly on corporate governance proposals of their portfolio firms and also provide better return performance. Furthermore, these funds tend to avoid investing in poorly governed firms. The results suggest that funds with quality governance are more likely to act in the interest of their investors, and that costs associated with funds' monitoring of their portfolio firms do not adversely affect their return performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Chou, Julia & Ng, Lilian & Wang, Qinghai, 2011. "Are better governed funds better monitors?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1254-1271.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:17:y:2011:i:5:p:1254-1271
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.06.008
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    Cited by:

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    3. Ding, Rong & Hou, Wenxuan & Kuo, Jing-Ming & Lee, Edward, 2013. "Fund ownership and stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 166-185.
    4. Kurniawan, Meinanda & How, Janice & Verhoeven, Peter, 2016. "Fund governance and style drift," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 59-72.
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    6. Steve Z. Fan & Linda Yu, 2016. "Variation in Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation – an International Study," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 16(4), pages 525-563, December.
    7. Nain, Amrita & Yao, Tong, 2013. "Mutual fund skill and the performance of corporate acquirers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 437-456.
    8. Bolton, Patrick & Li, Tao & Ravina, Enrichetta & Rosenthal, Howard, 2020. "Investor ideology," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(2), pages 320-352.
    9. Zhichuan Frank Li & Saurin Patel & Srikanth Ramani, 2021. "The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 174(3), pages 715-737, December.
    10. Ayadi, Mohamed A. & Kryzanowski, Lawrence & Mohebshahedin, Mahmood, 2018. "Impact of sponsorship on fixed-income fund performance," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 121-137.
    11. Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski, Oskar, 2012. "Crisis, internal governance mechanisms and pension fund performance: Evidence from Poland," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 493-515.
    12. Emmanuel Mamatzakis & Bingrun Xu, 2021. "Does ownership structure affect performance? Evidence from Chinese mutual funds," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1399-1435, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Proxy voting; Corporate governance; Mutual funds;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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