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Financing the rebuilding of the City of London after the Great Fire of 1666

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  • Sussman, Nathan
  • Coffman, D'Maris
  • Stephenson, Judy Z.

Abstract

This paper presents new archival data to analyse how, in the absence of banking or capital market finance, the London Corporation funded the rebuilding of London after the Great Fire of 1666. The City borrowed at rates much lower than previously thought from its citizens and outside investors to replace vital services and to support large improvement works. Borrowing was partly secured on its’ reputation and partly secured by future coal tax receipts. Although records show that the funding from these sources was forthcoming and would have covered costs, and most of the rebuilding project was completed in less than a decade, having invested in public goods without generating the expected fiscal flows, the City defaulted in 1683.

Suggested Citation

  • Sussman, Nathan & Coffman, D'Maris & Stephenson, Judy Z., 2020. "Financing the rebuilding of the City of London after the Great Fire of 1666," CEPR Discussion Papers 15471, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15471
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    Cited by:

    1. Ilan Noy & Toshihiro Okubo & Eric Strobl & Thomas Tveit, 2023. "The fiscal costs of earthquakes in Japan," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(5), pages 1225-1250, October.
    2. Ager, Philipp & Pedersen, Maja U. & Sharp, Paul & Tsoukli, Xanthi, 2024. "When London Burned to Sticks: The Economic Impact of the Great Fire of 1666," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 719, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    England; Financial development; Financial intermediation; Growth; Interest rate; Default;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions
    • N23 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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